In 2004, the Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Robert Charles said that cutting down the opium supply in Afghanistan was central to establishing a secure and stable democracy, as well as winning the global war on terrorism. Now, almost 20 years later, with the US troops slowly withdrawing from Afghanistan, there is a lot to reflect on.

Opium for Afghanistan has become a pillar of national economy, an adhesive and lubricant product that has fuelled four decades of long conflict. The opium economy is much more than just a simple economic industry, the growth of the industry stems from years of conflict which has weakened the formal market, and due to poor post-conflict infrastructure and irrigation system, have left farmers with little choices in their crop. At the same time, policy makers and foreign powers have failed to see the real dependency on opium. For Afghan farmers, lack of government guidance and reliable cash crop options has forced them to keep on producing opium. Hence why, the Afghan opium economy represents a more complex socioeconomic issue in Afghanistan, whilst there has always been a vast demand for opium, with the process of globalisation, the demand for Afghan opium has tripled over the years. With the country’s strategic location, opium is trafficked to South-East Asia via Pakistan and China, to Western Europe and North America via Central Asia and Russia.

Opium is produced from poppy seeds and after four months of seeding poppies, farmers use small, (hand-made) curved blades to mine the milky white liquid which then solidifies. The solid liquid is then sold in bulk to local trafficking networks who source it to labs in urban areas in Afghanistan and Pakistan for further production and then are trafficked across the globe. Opium production was first introduced by the Taliban to rural farmers in Afghanistan, mainly who resided in provinces of Helmand and Kandahar. The Taliban would provide Islamic sanction to farmers to grow more opium, and even though the Quran forbids Muslims from producing or imbibing illicit goods, the Taliban group justified their actions by stating the obvious that the ones consuming Afghan opium were non-believers rather than Muslims – in this regard, the Taliban had successfully found a ‘halal’ loophole. However, the same leeway was not given to hashish because that was mainly consumed by Afghans and Muslims. Soon after, the Taliban realised the potential opium revenue had to their operation and they quickly formulised it, they began to collect Islamic tax zakat on all dealers moving opium. Their revenue streams grew so did their operations, and by the end of their rule, a full drug economy was fully established. By 1997, Afghanistan surpassed Myanmar as the world’s largest opium production country accounting for more than 50% of the global supply of heroin and still holds that record.

With the US invasion in 2001, and years of foreign intervention one could’ve hoped that sustainable policies would be implemented that would improve the livelihoods of the Afghan people. However, with the invasion came the intense poppy eradication campaigns, and despite the initial decrease in opium production, their intense policies resulted in fertile land being destroyed. In addition, there was widespread of corruption in the government, and officials that were meant to stabilise the region, look after its people were the ones who gained more from the heroin trade than before. All of this resulted in a backlash by the local farmers residing in opium hotspots. With their economic bases being eroded, many farmers were left with little options, and many fled to Pakistan as economic refugees. The campaign failed to address the real issue, which was to introduce alternative livelihoods programmes that could overcome the hurdles placed by the war: to provide farmers with legal crop options and training programmes that could upskill them. The counternarcotic policies implemented by the international community sacrificed to an important opportunity to promote economic development in Afghanistan, to engage with rural Afghans and boost Kabul’s credibility.  

So, what is the current situation? Poppy cultivation is still very much active in Afghanistan, and the heart of the problem is government mismanagement and lack of alternative development programmes. Change is slowly occurring, Ghani’s cabinet of ministers are different from their predecessors, they want to see change and they want to bring back hope to farmers across Afghanistan. Initiatives have been introduced to provide farmers with alternative crop options such as saffron, pistachio and pomegranate but a stronger programme where crop-specific subsidies are given to farmers should be the governments and international community priority. Given that previous crops have provided profitable sources of income for Afghan farmers in the past, these crops would be strong candidates for subsidisation. In light of the international nature of Afghanistan’s drug-production problem, the funding for this programme should come from wealthier nations, who will themselves benefit directly from the shrinking of Afghanistan’s illicit economy.

The Next Century Foundation with the Kabul Institute for Peace recently prepared a special joint report on Afghanistan which discusses some key issues on Afghanistan. One key issue discussed is on the current drug economy and recommends what the next step should be to tackle it. Read the full report here.

Faria Ahmed