Perhaps the most well-known of Iran’s current crises is that associated with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Iran’s nuclear deal with the West. Talks are currently stalled.

Currently, the United States will not assure Iran that it will not pull out of the agreement for a second time, whilst Iran will not commit to another deal unless its Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps are removed the US terror group list.

What may appear to be a foreign policy matter also has domestic implications. Upon withdrawing from the Plan in 2016, the United States extended its Iran and Libya Sanctions Act by a further ten years, impacting Iran’s economy. Some $100bn USD of Iran’s assets are currently frozen, with sanctions affecting a diverse range of institutions, from banks to the oil sector.

In 2019, the United Nations Special Rapporteur concluded that sanctions would affect food security and the supply of pharmaceuticals in Iran, as well as the United Nations’ ability to work there. In cases where specialist medicines are required, for example for sufferers of epilepsy, they are often not available. Individuals with eye injuries caused by chemical weapons used during the Iran-Iraq war are also reportedly unable to access the medicines they need.

Iran’s Afghan refugee population have also been impacted by sanctions. With banking assets frozen, humanitarian NGOs such as the Norwegian Refugee Council have been unable to transfer donors’ money to their operations, making their work in public service areas such as education more difficult.

As sanctions affect the ability of the Iranian state to provide for its people, civil unrest is growing, creating another crisis.

In 2019, demonstrations began spreading across Iran, becoming the largest show of civil unrest since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979. In response to fuel price increases of up to 200%, spurred on by sanctions on oil companies, these soon developed into riots. Although official Interior Ministry figures suggest just over 200 protestors were killed during the Government’s response to this, international observers suggest the actual figure is more than 1,500.

After a pause in the earlier half of 2021, demonstrations again resumed in the July of last year and continue to have an impact on internal Iranian affairs to this day. Dubbed ‘The Uprising of the Thirsty’, these protests were largely a manifestation of the public response to the Government’s management of water resources.

Since the May of this year, these protests have shifted their focus towards food prices, as the globally rising cost of wheat makes staple foods like bread and pasta increasingly unaffordable for many in Iran.

As anti-government sentiment is building domestically, so too is the possibility of further instability.

Another problem for Iran is the ongoing situation with its Kurdish people, who report problems of their own. There is great poverty, particularly in the Ilam province of Iranian Kurdistan, and there are disputes about the Kurdish language and its teaching in schools.

To an extent, this puts the stability of the state into question. Though privately advocating an independent Kurdistan, actors such as the PDKI, claim to be supportive of a federal model whereby more power is devolved to each of the nations of Iran. Anti-Government sentiments are high among this community and others in Iran’s minorities.

All things considered, the current situation in Iran does not appear to be one of great peace nor sustainable stability. Not only are anti-Government voices loud, but also numerous.

Both the Iranian government and the sanctioning powers in the West seemingly bear some responsibility for the overlapping crises which are continuing to impact public services and general wellbeing in contemporary Iran.

Photo shows the Parliament of Iran.