Examining the ongoing peace negotiations involving the Russian Federation and Ukraine regarding the continuing conflict, and both the American and European led peace efforts:
Europe breaks from America
Sir Keir Starmer along with other European leaders and NATO allies have broken sharply with the United States on the Ukrainian crisis, with Europe as a whole continuing to back the Ukrainian side, this is a massive break from the United States’ policy and consequently showcases a disconnect across the pond. On the second of March 2025 Sir Keir Starmer, with the attendance of the majority of European leaders along with other allies, held a conference in London to reaffirm European commitment to the Ukrainian cause, calling it a “once in a generation moment” for the security of the continent. The summit showcased the continent’s unity in its support of Ukraine, leaders all agreeing that Europe must now be the driver of a just peace.
At the London conference, four key points were agreed upon:
- To keep military aid flowing to Ukraine and increase the economic pressure on Russia.
- That Ukraine’s sovereignty must be assured in a lasting peace, with Ukraine taking part in peace talks.
- In the event of a peace deal, Ukraine’s forces will receive increased defensive capabilities to deter a future incursion.
- Development of a “coalition of the willing” to deploy troops and guarantee Ukrainian sovereignty.
Europe is attempting to lead the narrative on peace in Ukraine, creating an united European front that they hope will sway the United States into action, however at the same time Sir Keir Starmer also showcased Europe’s continued reliance on the United States for defensive measures, stating that “this effort must have strong US backing“. This great European plan however has very little in the way of substance, with more funding for Ukraine but as of yet not moving forward toward peace.
How does this compare to Trump’s agenda?
The American administration has taken a different approach to Europe on this issue; key disconnects are listed below:
- Firstly, Ukraine’s involvement remains a key point of divergence. European leaders have insisted that any negotiations must include Ukraine directly, ensuring that Ukrainian representatives have a seat at the table. By contrast, the U.S.-Russia summit in Riyadh that began on the 23rd of March bypassed Ukraine entirely, with American officials engaging directly with Russia before engaging with Ukraine based upon a separate agreement with the Russian Federation. The U.S. is not merely acting as an intermediary but is also taking an active role in shaping the negotiations on behalf of both Ukraine and Russia — potentially sidelining Ukrainian decision-making in the process.
- Secondly, the Trump administration’s blanket refusal to give a security guarantee to Ukraine or consider Ukraine’s NATO membership, instead opting to use the mineral deal between Ukraine and the United States as a security guarantee, starkly contrasts with the coalition of European countries that could be involved in a future peacekeeping force that would wish to give Ukraine the security guarantees it desires. President Trump has consistently argued that Europe should take on more responsibility for its own defence, repeatedly asserting that he would not send U.S. troops to Europe in the event of an attack, due to his belief that Europe has long over relied on U.S. protection. The depth of this view was recently highlighted in a leaked Signal group chat, which included the Vice President, Secretary of Defence, and others. In the chat, Vice President Vance remarked, “I just hate bailing Europe out again.” This perspective carries significant implications for any potential European-led peacekeeping efforts, as theoretically Europe may no longer be able to count on U.S. backing in the event of a broader conflict.
Europe and the United States are moving in opposite directions on the Ukraine conflict. The U.S. is prioritizing a quick peace through negotiations but is unwilling to provide further military support to European and Ukrainian forces that in Europe’s eyes lay the foundations for longer term stability. By contrast, Keir Starmer’s plan positions Europe as the primary supporter of Ukraine, increasing defence spending and military aid whilst giving Ukraine the power to negotiate themselves. This renewed European commitment was underscored by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, who announced an €800 billion investment in European defence industries. Additionally, incoming German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has pledged to reform Germany’s borrowing policies to significantly boost defence spending, effectively doubling the country’s military budget. The key question remains: can Ukrainian sovereignty be secured with European backing alone?
Can NATO without the U.S. create a security guarantee?
The differences between Europe and the Americans are stark when it comes to peace, and their capabilities to bring it. The United States has a large advantage when it comes to military budget, having in 2024 spent $755bn on its defence, whereas the rest of NATO spent $430bn. Additionally when it comes to hard numbers the U.S. is superior, having roughly 2.3 million personnel, compared to the rest of NATO’s 1.5 million. This number is somewhat similar to Russian forces, numbering 1.32 million.
NATO, without the United States, is not significantly militarily superior to the Russian Federation at this current time, it would not have significantly greater operational capabilities in comparison to the Russian Federation. It does have advantages, with the remaining alliance having more advanced fast jets, tanks and naval forces than the Russian Federation. Whilst not overwhelming if the United States is not included, the other NATO countries do have significant forces. These forces however are not yet considered ready to go toe to toe with Russian forces after years of perceived underinvestment, the United Kingdom’s forces considered “too small” after cuts made since the end of the cold war. However as previously mentioned this underinvestment is being reversed throughout Europe. These future forces could effectively provide security guarantees to Ukraine, particularly in the long term after the European Union’s announced 800-billion-euro defence spending hike along with increases in spending from the United Kingdom. The question then becomes how this peace materialises.
Can Europe’s plan work – would the Russians accept it?
Can the remaining NATO states realistically broker peace? While the European summit reaffirmed support for Ukraine, it failed to present a clear path for negotiations with Russia. Without a viable framework for dialogue, Starmer’s four-point peace plan remains unattainable. Russia is likely to strongly oppose key elements of the proposal, particularly the deployment of NATO troops as a peacekeeping force — something President Putin has consistently rejected. Additionally, the plan’s commitment to increasing Ukraine’s military funding post-war is another major sticking point, as Moscow is unlikely to accept a well-armed, Western-aligned neighbour on its border.
Without this negotiating inlet it will be difficult to bring about the peace Prime Minister Starmer’s points suggest. The summit in reality only confirmed the European position, increasing aid to Ukraine in the short term, without being clear as to what the path to peace could be. The Americans’ viewpoint on this is clear, with Steve Witkoff (the American negotiator leading U.S. ceasefire negotiations) describing it as “posture and a pose”. He suggests that the current NATO framework protects European NATO nations, preventing Russia walking into Europe and consequently that Europe’s hardline stance is unwarranted.
This path to peace is the crucial thing that the Russian Federation needs. Blatantly crossing the Russian red lines with NATO troops and security guarantees will not bring the Russians into the fold but continue to push them away. Whilst Russia is not outright winning the war, the strategic situation according to the former Australian General Mick Ryan is currently producing a “surprising stalemate“. This stalemate means neither side is likely to gain considerable ground in the future, with either side unable to mount large scale offensives. This reality has been seen on the ground, with the Institute for the Study of War’s most recent report showcasing minimal Russian and Ukrainian advances in recent days, with many attacks being unsuccessful. With both sides seeing minimal gains, there is no great incentive for either side to sue for peace.
Paths to peace – concessions and negotiation
A potential path to peace means acknowledging there may have to be concessions, something that only the United States has been vocal about throughout the last month. What these concessions look like is debatable, however some possible examples are the Ukrainians recognising Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts as autonomous provinces under shared sovereignty, Ukraine abandoning hopes of retaking Crimea and withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from Kursk Oblast. The Next Century Foundation has already provided an example of concessions both sides may need to make. Europe and more importantly Ukraine showing that it is willing to make concessions is the first step to peace. Whilst this is not what the Ukraine government want, it is merely the reality of the situation on the ground. If the Russians will accept these concessions, is another matter. With the Russian Military calling up another 160,000 men between April and July this year, raising the maximum age for the draft from 27 to 30, they show no signs of entering a period of peace.
Despite the brutish nature of the American led peace process it certainly may be leading to peace quicker than the European way, with an already agreed thirty-day ceasefire covering energy infrastructure since the 18th of March in place. Additional peace processes are already in motion, with the most recent negotiations taking place covering safety of shipping in the Black Sea, resulting in a ceasefire that ensures safe navigation for commercial vessels in the Black Sea. This ceasefire has however been delayed, with Russia demanding that sanctions against food and fertiliser trade are lifted, this being something the United States has agreed to do. Despite the peace process arguably favouring Russia, it is moving much quicker than any previous effort that either Europe or Ukraine have come up with. Previous Ukrainian attempts to end the conflict, including five rounds of negotiations early on that resulted in at best the Istanbul communique, a treaty which would have severely limited Ukraine’s ability to defend itself in the future.
The American peace process is however also volatile, with President Trump stating that he was “very angry” with comments made by the Russian President regarding the credibility of Ukrainian President Zelensky and his ability to conduct negotiations. This has resulted in President Trump threatening secondary tariffs on all countries that import Russian oil. This potential economic pressure on Russia if a ceasefire is not signed is a further showcase of the brutish nature of American peace efforts, peace by coercion.
The Ukrainian minerals deal is yet another sticking point, with President Trump stating that Ukraine will have “big problems” if the deal is not signed, this comes as a parallel Russian rare earth deal is beginning to be negotiated as of the 31st of March. This new mineral deal is a new development so it is too early to tell if it will have an impact on the peace process, but it does put more pressure on the Ukrainian side to sign their deal to prevent a Russian deal and the consequent problems that would prevent.
What happens now?
Without a clear path to a swift peace, the war in Ukraine is likely to persist. For Keir Starmer’s coalition and its Ukrainian ally to have a meaningful impact on ending the conflict, they may need to consider concessions to Russia in exchange for a lasting settlement. However, such compromises could set a dangerous precedent for territorial disputes. The key challenge is whether European leaders can craft a deal that balances peace with credible security guarantees for Ukraine — and whether Russia would be willing to accept it. With further talks planned, it remains to be seen if this approach can deliver results.
Meanwhile, the peace process is largely being shaped by U.S.-led negotiations, with Ukraine’s future increasingly dictated by the Trump administration. It remains unclear whether Washington will firmly uphold Ukraine’s territorial integrity or yield to Russian demands in a final agreement. The recent Black Sea ceasefire talks resulted in a limited truce at sea (if Russian demands are met) but failed to achieve a broader peace settlement, only building gradually on the pre-existing thirty-day ceasefire on energy infrastructure. The volatility of opinion from the Trump administration also throws this process into doubt, with recent reports showcasing anger at both sides it remains to be seen if the American led peace process can survive this volatility.
This slow process and gradual peace underscores how distant a comprehensive resolution still appears. However, it is important to note that the initiatives led by the United States are the only ones resulting in any form of agreement so far.