Syria seized the international spotlight as 2024 drew to a close and an unprecedented rebel offensive swiftly toppled its 50-year old family dynasty. NCF Research Officer Silvia Luthi takes a closer look at the key players behind such a historic event:
At first glance, the rapid ousting of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, ruler for over 20 years, may seem to have come out of the blue. Indeed, for a long time, Syria’s socio-political landscape has remained below the radar of Western nations. Its brutal 13 year-long civil war – triggered by President Assad’s ruthless repression of the Arab Spring protests in 2011 – has often been referred to in the media as ‘the forgotten war’. This is despite its standing as one of the ‘largest displacement crises in the world’ – forcibly displacing over 12 million Syrians. Over the course of the years, President Assad managed to sustain his authority and contain the rebels with military support from his allies; Russia, Iran, and Lebanese militia group, Hezbollah. However, this time round, the Syrian President was backed into a corner by a lightning rebel advance, with little support from his allies – the resources and attention of which are primarily focused on the ongoing conflicts in Ukraine, Lebanon and Gaza. Regardless of whether the rebels’ blazing triumph was the result of fortune or perfect timing – the fall of Assad’s government hopefully marks the end of Syria’s intractable civil war, and in the same breath, sets the stage for a new political order. Though it is still too early to determine what this new order will entail, a closer investigation of Syria’s incoming leadership remains important, and could provide valuable insights into the trajectory of its future governance.
The Rebels who Seized the Moment
The ousting of President Assad can be credited to the Military Operations Command (MOC) coalition, a bloc of Syrian opposition groups bound together by a common interest: to remove President Assad from power. Historically, ideological and political differences among rebels have deeply fractured the opposition against the Syrian government – with violent confrontations between groups becoming a regular occurrence across the country. Against this background, the MOC’s collective victory is imbued with a sense of precariousness, as the coalition’s ability to work together – and not against one another – will be put to a test in upcoming weeks.
The Leading Faction: HTS
The MOC’s swift campaign was spearheaded by Islamist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the dominant rebel force in Syria following its seizure of control in 2017 over the Idlib enclave. Since its formation, at the outset of the civil war, the group has undergone significant rebranding as well as strategic shifts. In its earliest conception, the movement – then called Jabhat al-Nusra – was founded as a direct al-Qaeda affiliate. This was largely due to the fact that Abu Mohammed al-Golani, its founding and ongoing leader, had previously spent many years fighting for al-Qaeda in Iraq – and was later authorized to set up his own branch in Syria. In his first ever televised interview, Golani asserted his belief that Syria should be ruled according to Islamic Shari’a law principles, and expressed his intolerance for other religious minorities. On December 11th, 2012, the US State Department listed Jabhat al-Nusra as a terrorist organisation, followed by the UN two years later. Nevertheless, the opposition group maintained its connection and supported al-Qaeda even through the latter’s split in 2014 with the Islamic State (IS) – whose leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, had been pivotal in Jabhat al-Nusra’s creation.
However, in July 2016, Golani declared the disbandment of Jabhat al-Nusra, and with it, the severing of ties to al-Qaeda – whilst simultaneously announcing the creation of a new, locally-driven group, Jabhat Fatah al-Sham. This signalled the start of a significant shift in Golani’s approach – from a former al-Qaeda militant, seeking to govern Syria based on a strict interpretation of Shari’a law, to a tolerant leader, believing in the decentralisation of power to accommodate Syra’s religious minorities. Along with this shift, in early 2017, the group underwent its (until now) final transformation: merging with 4 different rebel factions to become what is known today as HTS. The leading mission of HTS is to establish Islamic governance in Syria by “toppling the criminal [Assad] regime and expelling the Iranian militias”. Once more, the rebel group explicitly stated its independence from other jihadist militant networks, and Golani’s efforts to detach HTS’ identity from its al-Qaeda origins continued further. In 2023, he abolished the religious police force, whose task was to ensure civilians were adhering to a strict interpretation of Shari’a law – and punish those who weren’t.
More recently, the leader dropped his nom de guerre to be addressed by his real name, Ahmed al-Sharaa, during official communications – so as to bolster his legitimacy. At present, HTS is still designated as a terrorist organisation by the US and the UN, and in 2018, by Turkey. However, despite the terrorist designation, these entities have softened their approach amidst HTS’ increasing consolidation of power and the growing humanitarian crisis in Syria. The UN special envoy for Syria has called on the international community to reconsider their stances for the sake of an inclusive transitional arrangement of power. Additionally, on January 6th 2025, the US issued a six month sanction exemption, which allows for the temporary conduct of certain energy transactions and also personal remittances to Syria – without actually lifting any existing sanctions on the nation.
The Syrian National Army (SNA)
Fighting alongside HTS is a coalition of Turkish-backed forces – best known as the Syrian National Army (SNA). As opposed to HTS, the SNA does not operate under a unified ideological/religious code – in fact it has experienced intra-group conflict in the past. Therefore, it is best described as an umbrella of armed groups, driven by a shared interest: to overthrow President Assad and ensure HTS doesn’t gain total control of recovered territories. Owing to its Turkish link, most of SNA’s military gains and activity remain focused in Northern Syria, near the border with Turkey. By supporting rebel militias along the border front, Turkey strives to both expand its territorial reach, and contain the threat of Kurdish militants – who are associated with Turkey’s Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).
The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)
The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) group is largely composed of members of the Kurdish-led People’s Protection Units (YPG), alongside smaller Kurdish and Arab militias, and stands as the SNA’s main opposition. The SDF emerged as a joint effort – largely supported by the US – to deter the Islamic State in Syria (ISIS)’s advancement, in 2014. Five years later, on the 23rd March 2019, the SDF captured the last village under ISIS control, Al-Baghouz, which is where the group originally declared its caliphate. This move marked the (almost) total defeat of ISIS, which – in the years following this – would attempt (and arguably fail) to make a comeback in Syria.
Several factors explain ISIS’s failure to rebuild its 2014-level military capacity – these include the Syrian government’s recapture of rebel-occupied territory, the waning popularity of extremist Salafi groups, and the overall decline of its military and financial resources, among others. Currently, amidst the power vacuum that President al-Assad’s ouster has created, the US has launched airstrikes against more than 75 ISIS camps in central Syria and deployed around 900 soldiers, to deter the faction from taking advantage of the unstable political conditions in Syria and regrouping.
It is also important to note that after ISIS’ defeat in 2019, the SDF strengthened its territorial control in northeastern Syria – over which the YPG already had considerable grip since 2012. Today, violence between the SDF and SNA has flared in Syria’s northern region that borders Turkey – particularly in the Kurdish-ruled city of Manbij, where in early December 2024, the Turkey-backed Syrian rebels launched an offensive and seized control of the territory. Fighting between these groups is largely rooted in Turkey’s long-standing conflict with the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) – which is believed to be connected to the SDF and is designated by Ankara as a terrorist group that poses a threat to the nation’s security and sovereignty.
Arab Tribal and Clan Forces (ATCF)
An additional and more recent opponent of the SDF, named Quwwat al-Qabail wa al-Ashaer al-Arabiya (Arab Tribal and Clan Forces, or ATCF), has become a prominent figure of resistance in the eastern Syria region. This group received support from ex-President al-Assad’s government and its Iranian allies – with the goal of reclaiming control over the eastern Euphrates river and Deir al-Zour region, previously seized by the SDF. This region is of particular strategic value, since it is Syria’s main oil and wheat production hub. By backing the ATCF, Iran seeks to thwart US influence in the region, whilst simultaneously expanding its own military dominance and strengthening its ‘Axis of Resistance’, through the establishment of “a northern land corridor leading to Aleppo”. Furthermore, ATCF’s figurehead, Sheikh Ibrahim al-Hifl (Abu Khalil), has urged the US and its allies for the creation of a tribal military council in replacement of the SDF authority in the east – though there has been no indication of this actually happening.
The Southern Operations Room (SOR)
On December 6th 2024, an additional coalition of southern and south-eastern rebel groups – composed mainly of former Free Syrian Army (FSA) soldiers and local Daraa militias – announced the formation of the Southern Operations Room (SOR) and joined the fight to “liberate” the Daraa province. Just hours after this announcement, the SOR seized control of a government military installation in the region. Additionally, in a public statement, the group declared “Our destination is Damascus, and our meeting point is the public square of Umayyads”. Indeed, only two days later, on December 8th, SOR overran the capital city of Damascus – which consequently prompted Assad’s escape to Moscow. However, SOR later withdrew its forces from the capital, allowing the leading faction, HTS, to take over. Although SOR’s precise leadership arrangement remains unclear, Ahmad al-Awda, former commander of the Sunni Youth Brigade, stands out as a key figurehead in the group. Awda gained his reputation as “Russia’s man in Southern Syria” after negotiating with the Syrian government – under Russian sponsorship – and handing over his factions’ heavy weapons in exchange for a commandorial position in the government’s Daraa military branch. This was part of Russia’s broader mediation campaign across Syria in 2018 – during which it facilitated negotiations between the Syrian government and distinct rebel groups to help recover the former’s control over lost territories.
Concurrent to SOR’s military activity in Daraa, local forces in the neighbouring Suwayda province – predominantly inhabited by Syrian Druze minorities – initiated their own attacks to drive government forces out, managing to seize control over the governate’s main prison and freeing its inmates. Though significantly smaller in military capabilities than the factions mentioned above, these groups are symbolic of the powerful proliferation of Syrian uprisings across the nation – which makes the prospects for a unified and collaborative governance increasingly complex.
The Road to Syria’s New Governance
Thousands of Syrians poured into the streets of Damascus and other cities to celebrate the fall of Assad’s 24-year autocratic rule. For many, whose family members have passed away or been displaced during the war, this historical event stands as a beacon of hope for a Syrian future that is peaceful and safe. However, such hope is also fraught with underlying uncertainty, as the new government of Syria now remains to be reconstructed. Exacerbating such fragile socio-political conditions are Israel’s expansive aerial attacks (over 350) in Syria, as well as its recent military invasion of the UN-declared Golan Heights buffer zone, which divides both countries. Israel justifies these attacks – mainly launched against military bases and ports, weapon warehouses and investigation centres – as an act of self-defence against the Iranian ‘Axis of Resistance’, used to prevent such radical groups from gaining access to Syrian military assets.
Additionally, Turkey has increased its support to the SNA, whose confrontations with Kurdish militias have flared across its border with Syria, in an effort to deter the PKK’s advancement. As Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated, “The only aim for our cross-border operations is to save our homeland from the terrorist attacks”. Finally, HTS leader al-Sharaa – now widely regarded as the most likely candidate to assume leadership in Syria – continues to emphasize his detachment from any Al-Qaeda links, and together with other rebels, has offered to take on a peaceful transition of power, as well as form agreements with local religious minorities. Nevertheless, given Syria’s predominantly Sunni population and its transition from an Alawite leadership – which mainly promoted a secular Arab nationalist governance – to a tentative Sunni Islamist one, religious minorities remain skeptic about the prospects of their safety. Therefore, although al-Sharaa’s plans so far offer a promising step towards inclusive governance on paper, important considerations such as the divided and conflicting rebel factions, and the particular vulnerability of religious minorities, put into question whether and how a stable transfer of power will materialize in practice.
