The following is the text of a two part report to be submitted to Israel’s President:

The Future governance of Gaza

In view of the suffering and pain Israel has endured since October 7, the time has come to think how to get out of this destructive cycle of violence. The State of Israel has a right to exist securely, and this cannot be achieved without Palestinian cooperation. The war in Gaza has taken the lives of citizens of the State of Israel and of the Palestinian Authority. The situation has caused widespread international anger. It is now important for Israel’s government to take a new stance on the issue, to meet its most important priority, the security needs of Israel’s people. 

In the aftermath of the heartrending events of the Gaza War, there is an opportunity for the introduction of new ideas for the future governance of Gaza and for a peace process, ideas that were previously impossible. The time has come to resolve this deep-rooted conflict for the sake of Israel’s long-term peace, stability, and security.

Possibilities for the future governance of Gaza are contingent upon a complex interplay of factors. Our recommendation follows. However, options for future governance include, but are not limited to, the following:

• Continued governance by the State of Israel

Israel’s continued governance of the Gaza Strip would involve a primary objective of removing Hamas from its position as the governing authority and ideally also dismantling its military infrastructure. Israel regards these steps as essential for the State of Israel’s future security and stability. If Hamas is successfully removed from governance and significantly diminished as a military force, there would be the possibility of withdrawing the Israel Defense Force’s ground troops. However, Israel may wish to continue to have a hands-on role. This could potentially restore stability but would be costly to both parties. For Israel, the financial costs associated with taking on the long-term administration of Gaza would be substantial. Israel’s continued governance of Gaza would also put its troops at risk, as was the case in the past. For Palestine, the psychological and social costs would be significant.

Israel is within its right to act as a protecting power under Article Nine of the Fourth Geneva Convention. However, prolonged occupation without progress towards sovereignty for the Palestinian population would of course be questionable, according to the same Fourth Geneva Convention (1949).

However, given that Hamas is likely to portray the presence of the IDF inside Gaza as a reason to continue fighting, the continued governance of Gaza by the State of Israel is implausible.

• Governance by the Palestinian Authority

The Palestinian Authority (PA) has administered parts of the West Bank in recent decades. However, in the eyes of the Palestinian public the PA has little credibility, on account both of its obvious failures in governance and of its failure competently to represent the Palestinian people, whether on the world stage or in direct discussions with Israel. Its perceived corruption and susceptibility to Israel’s influence make it unlikely that the PA would be accepted by the residents of Gaza without considerable reform. Even with appropriate international support and technical assistance to encourage the calling of the Presidential elections suspended in 2021, regaining the trust of the Palestinian people may be challenging. Some critics think that the PA should be dismantled. Nonetheless, if the PA regained Palestinian confidence, it could assume control of the police force and take administrative responsibilities. Israel’s government could pass its authority in the Gaza Strip to a well-supported Palestinian local administration appointed by a newly elected Palestinian President. 

• A Multinational Force

An international peacekeeping force could provide security and temporarily administer Gaza during an interim period to foster the establishment of a long-term, stable, and peaceful political solution. Broad international consensus and cooperation would be required, and there will be few Arab countries willing to commit forces to support the sustainable governance of Gaza. In the view of the Next Century Foundation, it would be valuable to have participation from the Republic of Türkiye and the European Union (respected by both sides), the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (with its historic responsibility), and Canada (Canada has been involved in peacekeeping in the Sinai Peninsula since 1985). Financial assistance and participation from the United Arab Emirates should be possible. The State of Qatar has an historic financial engagement. Whatever the composition of the multinational force might be, it would be essential that Israel commit to the rebuilding of Gaza.

• A protectorate

The future of Gaza could involve placing the area under the administration of an external power or international body to aid with managing governance and maintaining security, aiming for stability and development. Because of divisions within the Security Council a United Nations protectorate would not be possible. Nevertheless a protectorate established under other auspices is an option.

The United States of America and the United Kingdom could temporarily undertake the Gaza Strip’s governance as part of a Western-led multinational protectorate. Historically, Palestine was a British protectorate for thirty years, after World War One. During that time, infrastructure and administrative developments were significant but there were failures in creating a viable indigenous government in Palestine, leaving the region’s future to be determined by war. The Palestinian leadership might, however, view this option as an indirect occupation and oppose it.

• A Solely Arab Force

Arab nations could be involved with the future governance of Gaza; the involvement of Arab nations could add regional strength to the settlement agreed. Though the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan share borders with the Palestinian territories and have historic roles in Palestinian affairs, they are unlikely to take the risk. However some Arab nations could participate in an interim security force in Gaza and provide governance for Gaza.

As of today though, very little interest has been expressed by most Arab nations. With time and changes in political circumstances, more GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) states might join a multilateral force for Gaza. The United Arab Emirates recently said it might participate given the right circumstances.

Although this option could be possible, it would depend on the willingness of Arab states to commit to a long-term engagement and the cooperation of various Palestinian factions.

• Direct Palestinian control

This option would involve coordination between Fatah and Hamas. The recent talks in Beijing that resulted in the signing of a declaration aimed at ending the division between these factions were an attempt to undermine possible moves for a Palestinian strongman in control of Gaza that bypassed the Palestinian Authority. Direct Palestinian control would require substantial international support from regional players and the broader international community. However, since these Palestinian groups hold divergent aspirations and visions for the future of Gaza, finding a leader and effective collaboration could be extremely challenging. The complexity of the situation is also compounded by external factors. For example, Israel would oppose any collaboration with Palestinian factions such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad.

• Non-governance

In this possibility, the Gaza Strip would not be governed by any entity, neither Israel nor Palestine. Gaza’s residents would continue to live there, without leaders or formal law enforcement. Chaos would be permitted. However, without centralised authority, internal conflicts would naturally arise over time because different factions and groups would vie for power, causing internal violence. Worse, without leadership, Gaza’s access to aid would in effect be extremely difficult. It is also probable that in the absence of formal governance Hamas would be the group that led Gaza, which would not be acceptable to Israel.

All in all, it is important to recognise that currently Hamas have the veto power in almost every aspect of Gazan life. Hamas would almost certainly be willing to step aside from the future governance of Gaza, but it would still continue to operate there.

Recommendation

Palestinian governance in Gaza is a sustainable and preferable possibility. Options such as continued governance by Israel will only bring chaos and prolong the conflict. It is essential that a strong moderate Palestinian figure from Gaza is chosen to govern and administer the enclave.

During the initial period of new governance, a peacekeeping force should be put in place to ensure a smooth and violence-free transition to a sustainable day after. This force could involve international cooperation led by the European Union and would be even more effective with support from the Arab nations which would come with time. Israel’s financial or diplomatic commitment is also vital for rebuilding Gaza’s future. While there would be some resistance by Gaza residents, restoring a sense of security and shaping a clear vision for future governance would improve the confidence of the Gazans in the peacekeeping force.

A Peace Process

Israel has the right to exist securely. Since the war began on October 7th, Hamas does not appear to be weakening significantly. Therefore, it is important for Israel to start a peace process for the benefit of itself and its citizens. The primary concern for all parties – the State of Israel and the Palestinian Authority – should be the security and well-being of their people. This necessitates ending the fighting as soon as possible and initiating a peace process. Achieving this will enable the those of Israel’s citizens held hostage who remain alive to return home in exchange for Palestinian prisoners. While this objective will be challenging, it is possible with both regional and international support.

The options (and a recommendation) for an end to the Israel-Palestine confrontation, with or without an ongoing peace process, follow:

A hegemonic force over the Palestinians – the status quo

This involves Israel maintaining the de facto administration of the Palestinian territories as a hegemonic force whilst Palestinians may be given minor autonomy, in other words retaining the status quo. This hegemonic force could, however, be seen as a continued occupation, creating an unsustainable future for both Israel and Palestine. Such a settlement provides no change from the existing situation. This approach might neither bring peace nor even an end to the ongoing war, but pass on the suffering and conflict to the next generations of Israelis and Palestinians.

A one-state solution

A one-state solution envisions the establishment of a single, unified state which integrates Israelis and Palestinians with equal rights under the same government. The State of Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza strip would be integrated as one state.

Reconciling the national identities of the people of Israel and Palestine within a single state is challenging. A one state solution would undermine the concept of a Jewish state. A genuine one-state solution will never be acceptable to Israel since it would leave the state with a demographic question, because of any such state’s large Arab population. Potentially, this could create an apartheid state, resulting in an unsustainable future regionally and even more serious threats from Hamas locally. Security to the residents living in the state – Palestinian or Israeli, could not be guaranteed. Realistically, if this solution were attempted, a promise for equal rights for all would not be attainable. The overwhelming majority of the Jewish Israelis want a primarily Jewish state, and would not accept a one-state solution based on one-person one-vote with equal rights for Palestinians and Israelis.

A two-state solution

We therefore need to seriously consider a two-state solution which advocates the establishment of an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel with borders based on pre-1967 lines, ensuring sovereignty for both. This solution could allow for the right to self-determination for Israel and Palestine in their own sovereign states and is the most sustainable and viable way forward for both parties and for regional peace.

At the same time, the failure of the process-oriented Oslo Accords should be carefully studied. The Oslo accords left more difficult issues such as the status of Jerusalem in abeyance. We need a permanent agreement which goes much beyond but is based on the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002. If Israel wants a new bright future as a state, it needs a new definition of the two-state solution which should be built on solving what has failed before. To create mutual trust and partnerships is required.

The Next Century Foundation therefore supports the two-state solution due to its realistic potential to establish equal rights to self-determination and sovereignty for all. The following are key recommended steps to reach such a two-state solution.

A new Madrid-style Conference 

Israel and Palestine could come to the same table to express their visions for the future of Gaza and the West Bank, and work towards a resolution which they would both willingly accept. This peace process could and should also involve other Middle Eastern countries to enable focus on establishing the comprehensive regional peace that Israel needs.

To meet these needs, a new Madrid-style conference, similar to the 1991 Madrid Conference, should be promoted with the cooperation of the international community and Arab nations. This broader negotiation, rather than the merely bilateral peace process seen in the Oslo Accords (1993-1995), could enable the State of Israel to extract concessions from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states in return for the negotiations aimed at establishing a Palestinian state. A new conference that encourages full participation by the GCC would help Israel in the long term. The GCC states yet to recognise Israel are the State of Kuwait, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the State of Qatar, and the Sultanate of Oman (the Kingdom of Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates have already done so).

The conference could be held in a location like Vienna, given Austria’s comparatively neutral political stance, or even possibly hosted by one or more of the GCC states with the backing of key United Nations Security Council states with an historic responsibility for the region including the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and possibly also France. Israel needs to facilitate Arab states’ engagement on the basis of the Arab Peace Initiative (2002) and respect it as the foundation (though not the destination) for discussion. This approach would facilitate Israel’s recognition by more Arab nations. This would also, indirectly, help isolate Hamas from its position in governance in Gaza. The formal recognition of the State of Israel by one or more GCC states should occur simultaneously with Israel’s recognition of a State of Palestine whether or not a comprehensive peace process had concluded.

Bilateral peace discussions on matters of detail could meanwhile be brokered contiguous with the multilateral discussions in the conference.

Land swaps 

A two-state solution would include a bilateral negotiation on land swaps to formalise the boundaries of the Palestinian territories, an idea which has been accepted by both the Israeli and the Palestinian negotiators in the past. Since 80% of the settlers, including the two largest settlements the ultra-Orthodox Modi’in Elite and Beitar Elite live within a 4-5% radius of the Green Line international border, this would go a long way to neutralizing the obstacle of the settlers to a two-state solution. Any land offered to Palestine should ideally hold historic value for the Palestinians and have some strategic importance. In a perfect world this would facilitate the establishment of a contiguous state for the Palestinians though there may be difficulties in this regard. A land corridor between Gaza and the West Bank, and/or making Gaza more viable by widening the Gaza strip would be valuable moves. The land exchanged would not be so valuable that Israel will be significantly disadvantaged by losing it. Compromise and negotiation are key in this process.

End to Confrontation

With the current level of tension in Gaza and the West Bank, it seems difficult for the international community and Arab nations to be convinced that both Israel and Palestine genuinely seek peace and the implementation of a two-state solution. In order for effort in search of a two-state solution, and the land swaps involved to be encouraged, Israel could and should withdraw its troops from the already established Palestinian territories and respect their territorial integrity. Israel’s continued occupation of Palestinian territories poses significant risks to Israel’s future. In unique areas like East Jerusalem a joint patrol approach could be adopted as has been attempted successfully in the past. The security of the border with Israel should however be maintained by both Israel and Palestine to ensure stability and safety for both states. The full diplomatic weight of the regional and international community should be thrown behind supporting measures to ensure the ongoing stability and security of these borders; borders that matter not just to the parties concerned, but to the world.