It has been almost 50 years since Cyprus was divided and it remains a partitioned and ignored island state. The ongoing conflict, which is not really a conflict, more an old unhealing wound that hasn’t been dressed properly, is manifesting a deadlock in the East Mediterranean, and in the lives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Both parties only seem to be picking the scabs instead of meeting at the negotiating table. 

Back to the Future

The island of Cyprus has always been a hotchpotch of faiths, ethnicities, languages, empires and powers. As Professor Beckingham once described, “a plural society“. The arrival of the Mycenaeans in 1400 BC marked the beginning of Greek presence in Cyprus. Since then, the island has survived through countless empires: Ptolemaic, Roman, Byzantine, Republic of Venice, and the Ottoman Empire. Throughout this tumultuous period, Cyprus was declared- and arguably still is a condominium.

With the start of Ottoman rule in 1571, the relocation of Turkish families to Cyprus was used as a method to expand the Turkish population on the island. The current demographic of Cyprus which is largely composed of Greek-Cypriot Orthodox Christians and Turkish-Cypriot Muslims, is the direct manifestation of this order. 

With time, the growth of Turkish-Cypriot identity in Cyprus also strengthened Greek-Cypriot nationalism leading to the birth of the Enosis movement which demanded unification with Greece. When the British took administrative control in 1878, hope for Enosis began to gain major traction while insecurity and distrust were brewing among the Turkish-Cypriot community over their governance. In 1960, Cyprus gained independence and the new constitution split administrative control, appropriating a Greek-Cypriot President and a Turkish-Cypriot Vice President with a council of ministers in a ratio of seven Greek-Cypriot to three Turkish-Cypriot ministers. Fears of subjugation grew among the Turkish Cypriot community, driving a stronger affiliation with Turkey. The Turkish Cypriots also mobilised demanding Taksim, a two-state solution. 

In 1963, the eruption of intercommunal violence led to a strong Greek paramilitary intervention. In the aftermath, the two ethnicities retreated to their respective areas creating a north-south population shift. The Turkish-Cypriot community withdrew from the power-sharing government and the constitutional order broke down. The island had polarised in every way possible. The United Nations intervened in 1964 by creating a buffer zone, called the ‘green line’, which today marks the border between the internationally recognised Republic of Cyprus in the south, and the de facto state of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). 

The current dispute escalated after the 1974 invasion of the Turkish army into northern Cyprus following a military coup backed by the Greek government. Since then, the island has been physically divided. In 1983, the TRNC was declared independent in a unilateral declaration of independence however, this was shortly declared illegal by the UN Security Council, calling member states to not recognise it. The TRNC was, and still is, only recognised by Turkey and facing an international embargo. 

Decades later, negotiations for the Cyprus dispute are still ongoing albeit to no avail. The Annan Plan, a UN-brokered settlement plan that proposed unification in 2004, and which was largely acclaimed to be an adequate settlement plan by international observers, was rejected by 74% of Greek Cypriots while 65% of Turkish Cypriots had voted in favour of it. International conclusions from this claimed the Greek community was to blame for the ongoing conflict. However, up until 2004, the general consensus was framing northern Cyprus as perpetrators of division.

This is our home now

“Do you love your fatherland?  My fatherland has been split in half, which part must I love?” – translated from the poem, ‘Which Part?’, by Nese Yasin.

The politics of the dispute revolve around the discourse of nationalism, sovereignty, and independence, but in the local dimension of things, history is told through stories of lost community, friendship, and even, kinship.

Despite a violent past, Cypriots had, for several years, shared schools and communities, food and conversation, spaces and friends. The physical division in 1974 left an emotional scar on many Cypriots who were barred from ever walking along the same streets they grew up in, visiting their friends, or seeing colleagues. The buffer zone had cut right through Nicosia in barbed wire leaving an abandoned slice of homes with bullet holes, school buildings with piled sandbags, and cement walls blocking once lively streets. What was left were ghost towns and frozen memories with all personal connections severed for 29 years. 

When restrictions were partially lifted in 2003, allowing passage with valid documentation, there were accounts of nostalgic encounters of a once-shared experience of a country. This emotional side of the conflict is rarely acknowledged but composes a significant angle to the issue. There is evidence to believe that to an extent, Greek and Turkish Cypriots were getting along harmoniously before the division, which begets the question: why is a peace settlement proving to be so impossible?

A plural society has a plural idea of peace. What now? 

In mathematics, reducing a plural to a unified singular would mean subtraction. Sensitive matters weaved from a long history cannot be solved as easily. As in any conflict, the perception of the Cyprus dispute is also split which makes it incredibly difficult to untangle. The history, according to each side, has been adjusted to fit their unique telling of the story. There are two villains, two heroes, and two victims, and the negative influence of nationalism continues to hinder a peaceful outcome by demonising the ‘other’. 

Down south, the Republic of Cyprus enjoys UN and EU membership, a sovereign and recognised identity, and a stable, independent economy. A desire for enosis is largely abandoned and the lack of armed conflict has introduced a level of calmness. With the buffer zone now partially unrestricted, there might be little motivation for some Greek Cypriots to disturb the status quo. 

However, the Republic and the rest of the world, save Turkey, consider the island to be one entity with the north illegally occupied by Turkey. The narrative of the nature of the Turkish occupation is also mixed. While some see it as in defence of the Turkish Cypriots who were the vulnerable minority at the time, others suspect a more strategic incentive which they claim is supported by Turkey’s ongoing occupation of the TRNC today. Currently, approximately 35,000 Turkish military troops are present in the TRNC despite the UN Security Council’s calls for their eviction. Heavy military presence in the North is an undeniable point of contention for the South. Last year, tensions escalated following the USA’s lift of weapons embargo on Cyprus to which President Erdogan quickly reacted by “reinforcing military presence.”  President Nikos Christodoulides of the Republic of Cyprus stated in a memorial service last month, “In no way do we compromise with the occupation, in no way can the current unacceptable state of affairs be the future of our homeland. This is not the future we want to hand over to our children.”

Up north, where things are not as official, Turkish Cypriots are left in a state of limbo, polarised further into roughly pro-Turkey and pro-unification political groups in a continuous search for a solution. They are also able to cross the green line, have developed a democratic framework, and receive financial assistance from Turkey which supports their economy. Yet, they face the struggles of an international embargo, unable to access international markets and diversify their economy. Their heavy dependence on Turkey restricts several development opportunities for the TRNC and they ultimately lack a presence on the international stage. Some believe Rauf Denktas’ declaration of independence was a major mistake for the future of Turkish Cypriots as it rendered them without any legal status and thus, without any means of forming independent diplomatic relations. 

Furthermore, over recent years, northern Cyprus has observed an influx of Turkish settlers which skews the national preference for a pro-Turkey alliance. Questions should be raised as to what extent the ethnic Turkish Cypriots desire this outcome. Ostensibly, however, pro-Turkey sentiments are also thinning in the TRNC as religious conservatism is growing under Erdogan’s administration, which doesn’t align with largely secular Turkish Cypriots. It could then be argued that pro-turkey sentiments arise from existential fears rather than legitimate solidarity. 

While things might appear to be positive on the surface, legally and diplomatically, both parties are unhappy, and the citizens are agitated by the uncertainty of their future. In this political dimension, there is what Johan Gultung describes as “negative peace.” Peace does not merely mean an absence of war, and the “absence of violence” is not equivalent to sustainable peace. There remains an outstanding problem that needs a sustainable solution. Dialogue is paramount to resolving any conflict, but listening to understand the other side is the ingredient that is often missed.

Prospects of a new settlement plan aren’t expected to look much different from the Annan Plan, given that the concerns remain substantially the same. The little changes that have bloomed since 1974 haven’t developed further to provide a new foundation to work on.

Turkey has stated that a bi-communal, bi-zonal agreement plan will not be sufficient without recognition of the TRNC, which is legally contentious for the UN, and continues in its efforts to conjure a two-state solution. Meanwhile, international peace talks revolve mainly around settling a bi-communal plan. 

Unification Through American Brokerage? 

The United States possesses several advantageous factors that could play a pivotal role in pushing for a fair resolution. Firstly, being a relatively new player in this matter, the United States is viewed with less suspicion by all involved parties. Secondly, Washington has a track record of successfully bringing conflicting sides to the negotiating table, as seen in instances such as uniting Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin, Sinn Fein and the British government, and Israel with the signatories of the Abraham Accords. 

Perhaps there is hope for Cyprus. Well, let’s at least hope so.