As international attention remains firmly fixed on the situation on the ground in Gaza, many are beginning to look to the future. Whilst Israel’s ground invasion continues, the time has come to question what Israel’s long-term strategy is for the Gaza strip, given the unveiling of its three-phase plan of attack in which phase three stipulates the creation of a ‘new security regime in Gaza’.
The question remains however, as to what Israel’s long-term strategy is for the Gaza Strip post-invasion, a question made even more poignant given the growing humanitarian catastrophe the area is already facing. Given Israel’s strong desire to remove its responsibility for the Gaza Strip as stipulated within its three-phase plan of attack, few good options remain for the governance of Gaza post-invasion. What are the options on the table from Israel’s perspective?
Possible Outcomes in Gaza
1. A military reoccupation of Gaza:
Israel has a history of this – from 1967 to 2005, Israel occupied Gaza after seizing the territory from Egypt’s control in 1967, and only removed forces from Gaza in 2005 following the second Intifada. However, Israel has vocalised its desire to remove its responsibility for day-to-day life in Gaza, and on top of constituting a huge military burden, it seems highly unlikely Israel will benefit from further reoccupation.
2. Eliminate Hamas’ then leave:
The second phase of Israel’s ground invasion has been announced to be a long-term, targeted offensive against Hamas soldiers and infrastructure following the initial invasion, and so it stands that once Israel has achieved this objective, it might simply withdraw from the strip claiming victory. However, given Hamas maintains membership of several thousand individuals, it seems highly unlikely that Israel would be able to eliminate the entire organisation or stop another group, such as the Palestinian Islamic Jihad from taking power. The power vacuum that would ensue after the defeat of Hamas would almost certainly raise additional security concerns for Gaza, making this outcome far-fetched.
3. Call on the Fatah party to take control in Gaza:
Given Mahmoud Abbas’ lengthy leadership of the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, one could argue that Israel might call on the Fatah party to take control of Gaza post-invasion, in an attempt to allow for a Palestinian-centred governance whilst imposing a less-extreme alternative to Hamas. This scarcely seems likely, given the rift between Hamas and Fatah post-2005. The PA lacks legitimacy in Gaza. Former Prime Minister Salam Fayyad says in a recent Foreign Affairs article that he’s “doubtful that the PA as currently configured would be willing to shoulder the responsibilities of governing Gaza after a deadly and destructive Israeli offensive runs its course.”
4. Administration of Gaza by local leaders:
Upon Hamas’ defeat, Israel has the option to sponsor and non-aligned local leader to take power in the Gaza Strip, which would remove Israel’s responsibility for day-to-day life in the strip, whilst addressing Israeli security concerns. In reality, this is wholly unrealistic, most significantly given that Gazans would almost certainly see this individual and/or government as collaborators with Israel. It is hard to conceive that individuals such as Mohamed Dahlan would be able to take power by remaining Palestinians, in spite of whatever desires Israel has to maintain a non-aligned government in Gaza. None the less Dahlan is one of those backing the idea of a government of technocrats for Gaza. Dahlan does retain a small and localised support base in Gaza, particularly in his hometown of Khan Younis.
5. Administration of Gaza by a non-Palestinian Arab force:
A further option for Israel post-invasion, and an option which it seems more likely to pursue, would be the governance of Gaza by a non-Palestinian Arab force, which would both remove their responsibility for Gaza and address security concerns, given Arab nations seem highly unwilling to let the conflict escalate. However, the only Arab nations who would be in a position to govern Gaza, think Egypt, Jordan or Saudi Arabia, seem wholly opposed to the idea. The leaders of these nations would not want to be seen as policing Palestinians on behalf of Israel and would view such governance as being complicit in the Israeli ethnic cleansing of Gaza.
6. Administration of Gaza by a non-Arab or United Nations force:
In reality, this option seems like a pipe dream. There exists no non-Arab country who is both in a position to govern Gaza and is willing to do so, given the majority of influential Western countries are staunchly pro-Israel and would thus govern Gaza firmly through a security lens on behalf of Israel. Further to this, a UN peacekeeping force would not only require the approval of Israel, but also a UN Security Council resolution, which seems near impossible given the opposition of both Russia and China to what they see as the Western ignored war in Gaza.
It seems therefore that there are no realistic or viable long-term plans for Israel in Gaza post-invasion, which makes Israel’s current bombardment and invasion of Gaza even less tenable if post-war stability is what is being aimed for. Israel has no long-term plans for the governance of the Gaza Strip or the people who reside within it in the absence of what would amount to ethnic cleansing.
Recent Reports out of Israel
A recent report by Israel’s Intelligence Ministry – a ministry that conducts research but does not set policy – has offered three alternative approaches to effect significant change in the security reality of Gaza, the most popular of which proposes the moving of Gaza’s civilian population to northern Sinai and establishing a security zone inside Israel to block displaced Palestinians from entering.
The report proposes moving the civilian population of Gaza to northern Sinai, then building permanent cities and an undefined humanitarian corridor, but does not define what would happen to Gaza once the population is forcibly removed. What we can likely infer is that as part of this plan, Israel would annex large parts of the Gaza Strip, similar to Gush Katif in 2005, with Palestinians either being wholly displaced from the entirety of Gaza, or a limited population allowed to remain in unspecified parts of the strip
Egypt has already made clear this is not an option and does not want a repeat of the events surrounding the 1967 war. This would both end the Palestinian nationalist cause and risk bringing militants into northern Sinai where they might launch attacks on Israel, further drawing Egypt into the conflict. Egypt’s foreign ministry has made clear throughout the conflict that a wave of Palestinian refugees into Egypt will not be a reality.
Following this, director of the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv University and former commander of Military Intelligence Amos Yadlin stated that the only way to address the taking control of and rehabilitating of the Gaza strip is the re-establishment of the Palestinian Authority in Gaza, but it remains to see whether this is feasible, given the PA both does not have the resources to control Gaza and does not have a political will to do so. If hypothetically this were to take place, he argued, it would almost certainly happen under demands from the PA to re-establish a peace process. The PA will not take de-facto control of Gaza without assurances for future relations, and so Israel will have to decide whether to continue to spend its military resources fighting in Gaza or accepting this demand for long-term peace negotiations – neither of which are popular choices within Israel’s current government.
With no viable choices on the table, the question remains as to what Israel’s long-term goal is in Gaza, and how this will influence their next steps in the invasion on the ground. With no goal in sight, will the bombardment of Gaza continue, and how many more lives will be lost before this situation is resolved?
The image used above is from Hosny Saleh
