NCF Research Officer Felix Mohaupt explores how the incoming Trump administration might shape the war in Ukraine, predicting an end to U.S. aid and a ceasefire that could disadvantage Ukraine by solidifying territorial losses.

Donald Trump’s victory in the American presidential election at the start of November has changed the calculus concerning Ukraine. 

Trump’s victory comes as his campaign and policy positions have veered further from the mainstream, backed by conservative activists and individuals who are on record as being against aiding Ukraine in its war with Russia. Trump has himself used the aid given to Ukraine as a cudgel against the Biden administration. 

The new Trump administration is unlikely to achieve his claimed goal of achieving peace in Ukraine before he enters office on January 20th. President Trump will almost certainly force a ceasefire in the conflict. Russia has been making gains which will now slow because of the onset of winter. Trump will in any case cease support to Ukraine, forcing their current military strategy and apparatus to collapse without the influx of US aid. 

Trump’s campaign promises

Trump has spent much of his campaign railing against the Biden administration for its support for Ukraine, which has been  both military and financial. President elect Trump, who has always been keen to promote himself as the ‘peace’ candidate, claims that the war would not have started in 2022 had he been in office instead of Joe Biden. Throughout the presidential campaign, Trump has promised that he would seek peace in Ukraine, and that Ukraine’s focus shouldn’t be on ‘territory’ but on peace.

Trump has a history of difficult relations with the Zelensky administration. During his first administration, Trump was threatened with impeachment (but exonerated by the Senate) over his attempted withholding of military aid unless the Ukrainians investigated dealings in the country by Joe Biden and his son Hunter Biden.

Trump’s campaign has been critical in slowing down and obstructing US aid to Ukraine. An aid bill worth $61 billion was held up by significant opposition from Republican congressmen and Trump’s own proposals of reconfiguring the aid into ‘loan deals’ are unlikely to work. Ukraine having to pay back the aid it’s received, as a policy proposal from President elect Trump, is impractical. Paying back such significant sums would cause further damage to an already broken economy: a third of the populace have been displaced and its most important industrial areas (The Donbass) are now under Russian control. Both industry and infrastructure in the Donbass are severely collaterally damaged by the Ukrainian counter attack against the Russian forces. Furthermore, Ukraine’s Black Sea ports, such as Mykolaiv and Mariupol, have been damaged extensively by the conflict and will need considerable further aid to help their reconstruction. 

The incoming administration’s reluctance to support aid for Ukraine

Trump is inconstant. His first administration was full of unusual attempts at foreign policy victories. His attempted negotiations with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to denuclearise the peninsula were innovative but went nowhere. His attempt at fostering peace in Israel was unexpectedly novel in many of its dimensions and could have been used as a starting point for negotiations by the Palestinians but it was rejected out of hand by Abu Mazin and became a mere olive branch to Israel’s hard right. And he sent the first lethal aid package to Ukraine, and then attempted to withhold that aid in order to dig up dirt on Joe and Hunter Biden for use in the 2020 election campaign. Trump is mercurial. He has of course shown some change from his earlier position and the threats to abandon or condition aid to Ukraine, but his administration will be much less favourable to Ukrainian pleas for help. 

The incoming Trump administration is much different from his first; major conservative think tanks such as the Heritage Foundation together with members of Trump’s staff have been developing a plan to cement their control over the United States. The new administration includes politicians and commentators with a history of apathy towards Russia’s actions in Ukraine be nominated for many essential foreign policy related positions. 

J.D Vance, the vice-president-elect, has clearly stated that Ukraine would not receive further aid were he in charge. Vance has also proposed his own peace plan, which was fairly similar to Putin’s peace plan proposed earlier: all territory currently contested would be turned into a demilitarised zone, while Ukraine would adopt perpetual neutrality. Vance is on record as having said he ‘doesn’t care about Ukraine’, that they (the US) should leave and stop being involved in a ‘forever war’. 

Trump’s new Director of National Intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard, has been accused of being a Russian asset by both US allies and other figures in American politics. Gabbard has dismissed claims that President Assad of Syria used chemical weapons and has claimed that the United States is at fault for Russia’s incursions into Ukraine. Russian TV has even called her a ‘friend of Russia’. 

Some of Trump’s largest backers will also have a say in the incoming administration’s stance on Ukraine. Elon Musk, who is slated to co-lead the new DOGE department (the Department of Government Efficiency), has been reported to have been present on the calls between President Zelensky and President elect Trump. Musk had been an influential supporter of Ukraine earlier on, allowing their armed forces to use his StarLink satellite internet service when their own communication networks were damaged or not present. Musk has changed his views on Ukraine, allegedly, replying to Zelensky’s assurances that no one could enforce a ceasefire on Ukraine without their approval with a joke on X that Zelensky had an ‘amazing sense of humour’. Musk has veered rightwards politically and seems to be another anti-Ukrainian voice within the Trump administration, and an especially influential voice if reports are to be trusted. 

Even if Trump were to soften his position on Ukrainian aid, the administration he has behind him will encourage him to either go back to his original stance or to put large conditions behind the deliverance of aid.    

Could Trump actually force a deal on Ukraine?

Some argue that US Presidents often aren’t able to really affect other state’s foreign policy, Biden’s policy towards Israel could be an example. The difficulty with this assumption is that actually Biden and the US government, as Israel’s largest arms supplier and biggest international ally, have plenty of leverage over Israel but do not have the will to use it. Owing to Ukraine’s much weaker position compared to Israel vis-à-vis the US and its regional position, President elect Trump would have more leverage and has no historical ties to the nation, or any compunction about attempting to force what he wants from them. Both countries are on war footings, but Israel is the most advanced economy in the region, wields the most advanced military in the region, and now has a number of stable alliances that allow it to act at will effectively. Ukraine is poorer than its neighbours, its military was reliant on Soviet surplus armaments until 2022 effectively, and now has been embroiled in a devastating major conflict with its largest neighbour on its own territory since 2022. 

Ukraine’s war effort is reliant on outside help. Ukraine’s military uses up to 2,000 artillery shells a day, which pales in comparison to Russia’s 10,000, it can’t itself produce those munitions in numbers required so it relies on military aid. This imbalance runs for every piece of equipment used currently in the war. Ukraine’s government can’t even pay for its services or the wages of its workers, it relies on US and EU funding to make up that gap in its budget. 

Trump has leverage over Zelensky and his government. Were Trump to pull away the funding; the $23 billion in direct government support, and the $64 billion in military aid would stop. Without that funding, which the EU is unable to match, it still would be extremely harmful. EU nations could very well scale back their support were Trump to do so. The Ukrainian war effort would not be able to go on at the same pace, especially as the Russian effort expands. North Korean troops are confirmed to have been used in direct combat, North Korean shells are now entering service and the Russian army is recruiting 30 thousand men a month. The tide has turned in favour of Russia, and were Trump to pull funding and demand a ceasefire, the Ukrainians could attempt to hold out a little longer, but it would be futile. 

Putin is also under pressure for a peace deal. Russia cannot produce the equipment it needs either in the quantities required. Hence the deal for shells and soldiers from North Korea, drones from Iran and even foreign recruitment from places such as Cuba. Putin is increasingly under pressure to make peace as the Russian economy cannot continue on a war footing indefinitely. A Trump deal could effectively hand over all of ‘Novorossiya’ to Russia, either directly or with enough caveats in Russia’s favour that it will hold significant influence. It goes without saying that Ukraine would not be able to join NATO as long as it was unable to enforce it’s control over all it’s sovereign territory, especially with Trump holding a veto on its membership. Putin would be hard pressed in his own circle not to accept a deal were it offered.

The other big player is China, who put forward a deliberately vague peace proposal back in 2023. China since has stepped back from the conflict having not attended the Lucerne peace conference in June of this year (Russia did not attend either indeed it was not encouraged or invited to do so). A concerted push from China would help the Russians to come to the negotiating table, but that does not seem likely even though the war touches Asia with North Korean troops entering the conflict on Russia’s side. This leaves the US (and arguably Ukraine) as the only major player who claims to be serious about a ceasefire and, eventually, peace in the region. 

Reduction or even withdrawal of US aid to Ukraine is not guaranteed. The new Senate Majority Leader, John Thune, is a staunch defender of US aid to Ukraine while the outgoing leader, Mitch McConnell, has recently shown some hesitation with outright acceptance of Trump’s cabinet nominees, and Trump himself, even if only for appearances’ sake, would not be pleased were Putin to overwhelm Ukraine. Trump, though, is the undisputed leader of the Republican Party, senators may show resistance now, but once January 20th comes and Trump enters the White House, the GOP is likely to lay down and approve whatever he demands, much as the party has been slowly programmed to do since 2017. With GOP control of all three American government branches, if Trump wants aid to end for Ukraine and a ceasefire to occur, aid will end and Trump will have a free hand to pressure and nudge Zelensky until he agrees to go to the negotiating table in a weaker position than Putin will be in.