Syria’s transitional government continues its push for stability amid diplomatic efforts, economic manoeuvres, and security challenges. With shifting regional alliances and ongoing negotiations, do the latest developments highlight progress towards overcoming the persistent hurdles in the country’s path forward.

Alawite Massacre on the Syrian Coast

In recent days, the Syrian coastal region, particularly Latakia, has witnessed unprecedented violence as Hay’at Tahir al-Sham (HTS) launched brutal assaults on Alawite villages. The conflict erupted after an HTS patrol on March 6th attempted to detail individuals but was met with resistance and forced to retreat. In retaliation, HTS returned with reinforcements, escalating tensions and fighting in the region. As tensions mounted, non-Arab fighters were deployed to combat the Alawite resistance.

Syrian government forces, under President Ahmed al-Sharaa, responded with full-scale military operations, vowing to crush what they labelled as remains of the old regime. However, Alawite civilians have rejected this narrative, insisting they have been abandoned by Bashar al-Assad. The situation was exacerbated by an HTS helicopter attack. They dropped barrel bombs over Jableh and Kadaha, which were met with warning shots from a Russian airbase.

By March 9th, the crisis had reached catastrophic levels, with over 3000 Alawite civilians reportedly killed in targeted massacres. Survivors recount that men were executed in front of their families, and villages have been left devastated. While official Syrian sources claim these operations are part of a crackdown on militants, independent monitors describe the situation as an indiscriminate slaughter of civilians.

Amidst the violence, two senior Alawite figures, Ghayas Dalla and Munir Malas, who initially endorsed the community’s armed resistance, have now found refuge in Paris and Lebanon. Despite their early calls for Alawites to take up arms, they have remained largely silent as the massacre of their communities unfolds. This has led to deep resentment among displaced Alawites, many of whom feel abandoned by those who once positioned themselves as their leaders. The failure of these figures to act, even as thousands are being killed, has reinforced the perception that the Alawite community is being left to its fate—not only by the international community but by its own leadership.

The Syrian government has announced a fact-finding committee to investigate the killings, stating that “no one is above the law”. However, scepticism remains high, with critics viewing this as a move to deflect international pressure rather than ensure accountability. Interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa has vowed to restore order, but his administration is facing mounting scrutiny. His government is being accused of openly celebrating the massacre of Alawites, framing it as a victory over Assad’s remnants. For many, this raises doubts over whether Syria’s transitional government is truly moving towards national unity—or simply shifting power dynamics in a cycle of continued sectarian violence.

Political rapprochement and National Dialogue

President Ahmed al-Sharaa is trying to rebuild Syria’s diplomatic standing. On February 26th, al-Sharaa met with King Abdullah of Jordan in Amman, both agreeing to bolster border security to combat arms and drug trafficking. King Abdullah also condemned Israel’s recent airstrikes on Syrian territory.

A National Dialogue Conference was meanwhile held in Damascus. The conference, attended by hundreds of selected invitees, aimed to draft a roadmap for Syria’s future. The closing statement emphasised freedom of expression and peaceful coexistence, although it notably did not address the role of religion in the state, other than rejecting sectarian or ethnic quotas in public office. However, Kurdish authorities in the northeast – who played a crucial role in the fight against ISIS – were excluded from the conference. In fact, all major political groups were deliberately left out, as the conference only permitted participation from independent individuals,  rather than representatives of established factions. Excluding political organisations, opposition groups, and ethnic factions severely limits the legitimacy of the dialogue process.

A major issue that remains outstanding is the unification of Syria’s fractured armed forces. Various factions, including members of the former government’s military, rebel groups, and Kurdish-led forces, continue to operate independently. Defence Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra has expressed the government’s desire to integrate all factions under the Ministry of Defence, advocating a unified command structure. However, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have resisted full integration stating they aim to retain autonomy. While the government endeavours to complete this process as quickly as possible, the lack of a clear plan for military consolidation could hinder Syria’s broader efforts at unification and stability.

Adding to these internal political pressures, the newly formed Alawite Council has issued an ultimatum to Syrian authorities, demanding increased political representation and protection of Alawite religious and social interests. The council’s concerns further highlight the sectarian and political tensions within Syria as the new government cements its grip on power.

Meanwhile, divisions have resurfaced among Arab states regarding the new Syrian administration. On March 4th, an emergency Arab League summit took place in Cairo, focusing on forming a unified Arab stance on Gaza. Syria’s new President al-Sharaa’s was invited. His invitation signals renewed engagement, however whether full regional acceptance follows remains uncertain.

Escalating Tensions in Jaramana

Syrian security forces have been deployed in the densely populated suburb of Jaramana, near Damascus, in an effort to restore order following days of unrest and militia resistance. The escalation was triggered by the killing of Ahmed Al-Khatib, described as “an official with the Ministry of Defence”, after which local armed groups refused to hand over the suspects to authorities. The government has since framed the operation as an attempt to end “chaos” in the area, dismantle  militia checkpoints, and curb criminal activity, including kidnapping, armed robbery, and extrajudicial killings. Security operations intensified after militants rejected mediation efforts and refused to surrender their weapons. A violent dispute at a militia-controlled checkpoint on Friday28 March had further escalated tensions, resulting in the death of one Syrian security officer and the injury of another.

While Damascus moves to reassert control, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has attempted to present Israel as a protector of Syria’s Druze, implying they are under threat from government forces. However, Druze leaders in Syria have categorically rejected this claim, asserting that their struggle is an internal Syrian matter and dismissing Netanyahu’s rhetoric as politically motivated interference. Many have pointed to Israel’s treatment of Druze in the occupied Golan Heights, arguing that Netanyahu’s remarks are inconsistent with Israel’s broader policies towards Druze communities in the region. The situation remains volatile, with the Syrian government determined to crush militia resistance, while external actors like Israel attempt to exploit the instability for political leverage.

Security and Regional Tensions

Security concerns continue to shape Syria’s transition. On February 23rd, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared that Israel would not permit Syrian forces to operate south of Damascus, insisting on the complete demilitarisation of the region. This stance was condemned at Syria’s National Dialogue Conference, where participants labelled Netanyahu’s remarks as “provocative” and demanded Israel’s immediate withdrawal from Syrian territories. In response to these condemnations, Israel’s warplanes conducted airstrikes on February 25th, targeting military sites in Kiswah and the southern province of Daraa. Israel stated that the attacks were aimed at eliminating threats posed by militant groups, reinforcing Benjamin Netanyahu’s position on the demilitarisation of southern Syria.

Meanwhile, US airstrikes have also continued in the northwest, targeting remnants of militant groups that previously operated under Hurras al-Din, an organisation that formally dissolved in January 2025. Despite its disbandment, some former members remained active, prompting ongoing counterterrorism operations. On February 23rd, a US airstrike killed Muhammed Yusuf Ziya Talay, a senior military leader formerly associated with the group.

Economic Recovery and Sanctions

A key priority for al-Sharaa’s government is securing the removal of international sanctions. The new leadership has proposed privatising state-owned enterprises to attract foreign investment. The European Union recently suspended some sanctions on Syria’s energy and banking sectors as a measured step to encourage democratic reforms. However, if political reforms stall, sanctions may be reimposed. At the same time, Qatari financial aid intended to increase Syrian public sector pay has been delayed due to concerns over US sanctions. Despite a US sanctions exemption issued in January, uncertainties remain over financial transfers via Syria’s central bank.

This hesitation highlights the broader difficulties Syria faces in attracting international aid and investment. Meanwhile, Syria’s Oil Ministry has confirmed that northeastern oil shipments are now reaching Damascus, indicating a possible understanding been the transitional government and local Kurdish officials. Nevertheless, economic instability persists, and lifting sanctions remains a key focus for al-Sharaa.

Lebanon-Syria Border and Smuggling

The Lebanon-Syria border remains a hotspot for smuggling, involving anything from drugs and weapons to food and electronics. Smuggling in this region is deeply entrenched and has long been driven by economic necessity. Smugglers along the border are primarily from Shiite villages on the Lebanese side, organising operations that have persisted despite government crackdowns. However, some Sunni villages, previously excluded from smuggling, have started to participate due to shifts in the regional balance of power, particularly with the rise of HTS in Syria. This shift has caused tensions between different communities along the border. There have been clashes between rival smuggling groups, with HTS intervening to support Sunni villages against Shiite factions. HTS have seized properties in contested areas, further escalating hostilities. While the Lebanese army has begun securing its side of the border, bringing some stability, tensions remain high, particularly between villages that are split across the border and among communities with dual nationalities. Managing these border tensions will be a critical issue for the new leadership moving forward.

Conclusion

Syria’s path to recovery is fraught with challenges, encompassing diplomatic relations, economic sanctions, security concerns, and humanitarian crises. The transitional government’s initial priority is, perhaps inevitably, dealing with its security concerns. The success of this effort will also depend on sustained international engagement and the inclusive participation of all Syrian stakeholders.

Image above by Dianne Ket from Pixabay