As we mark the first anniversary of the October 7 attacks, which saw horrific assaults on Israeli civilians by Hamas, the subsequent deaths of thousands in Gaza and the recent escalation of the conflict in Lebanon, critical questions arise regarding Israel’s broader security strategy. In this article, Research Officer Cristina De Leo examines the effectiveness of a key pillar of Israel’s defence approach: nuclear deterrence. With recent events underscoring that military strength alone does not guarantee national security, the article provides a broader, in-depth assessment of the historical role of nuclear weapons in strengthening Israel’s security. It seeks to answer a critical question: have nuclear weapons truly enhanced Israel’s security?
The unprecedented surprise attack on Israel on October 7 served as a stark reminder that Israel’s deterrence capabilities – whether nuclear or conventional – are not infallible. The Hamas attacks challenged core principles of Israel’s defence strategy, raising critical questions about the overall effectiveness of relying solely on military strength. Israel’s nuclear weapons have been a central pillar of its national security architecture. As such, in light of recent events, an overall assessment of the role of nuclear weapons in enhancing Israel’s security seems timely. To this end, this article conducts a historical analysis to determine whether nuclear weapons have truly strengthened Israel’s security. It examines the impact of nuclear weapons on three areas that are of critical importance for guaranteeing Israel’s security: the Arab-Israel peace process, the prevention of an attack by an Arab coalition, and regional nuclear non-proliferation.
A Brief Overview of Israel’s Nuclear Programme
Israel’s nuclear programme began in the mid-1950s and was implemented through the construction of its core nuclear infrastructure in Dimona. Israel’s first deliverable nuclear devices are thought to have been completed in 1967. The nuclear posture of Israel has been underpinned by a policy of nuclear ambiguity, which means that Israel does not confirm or deny its possession of nuclear weapons.
Have Israel’s Nuclear Weapons Strengthened its Security by Triggering the Beginning of the Arab-Israel Peace Process?
The 1979 Israel-Egypt peace agreement is a key development that has enhanced Israel’s security. Given the history of the emergence of Israel, which made its entrance in 1948 through a humiliating defeat of the Arabs, the survival of the Jewish state was precarious. The 1979 Egypt-Israel peace treaty played a significant role in securing Israel from existential threats as the danger of Israel being destroyed by a successful Arab invasion in the absence of Israel’s strongest enemy – Egypt – was significantly reduced. It therefore makes sense to consider the role of Israel’s nuclear weapons in the Egypt-Israel peace agreement in order to develop a broader understanding as to whether they have played a significant role in strengthening Israel’s security.
It has often been argued that Israel’s nuclear weapons have been a catalyst for the Israel-Egypt peace agreement because they compelled the Egyptian leadership to accept that the resolution of the Arab-Israel conflict could only be achieved through diplomatic means. Yet, whilst there is a correlation between the acquisition of Israel’s nuclear weapons in the late 1960s and the peace agreement of 1979, upon further inspection, one can see how nuclear weapons were almost irrelevant in the Egypt-Israel peace agreement. Rather, what triggered the process was more to do with the dynamics brought about by the 1967 and 1973 wars, which made peace between Israel and Egypt necessary.
Indeed, rather than Egypt reconciling itself to Israel’s existence because of its nuclear capabilities, it was more the case that after the 1967 war, Egypt needed peace with Israel in order to rebuild its economy. In their remarkable account, A History of the Modern Middle East, Cleveland and Bunton explain that as a result of Israel’s seizure of the Sinai from Egypt in the 1967 war, Egypt could no longer benefit from the revenues of the Sinai oil fields and the Suez Canal – which Egypt had closed to shipping in order to prevent transit as a result of Israel taking control of the Suez Canal’s east bank. The perpetual state of conflict with Israel meant that Egypt had to invest in military expenditures that were damaging the Egyptian economy, and as long as the Sinai remained under Israeli occupation, Egypt would be denied from potential sources of revenue such as tourism, Suez Canal tolls and foreign investment. This suggests that Egypt needed to take back the Sinai from Israel but that, because of its economic challenges, did not want to do so by waging war. This was reflected in Sadat’s peace proposal with Israel in 1971 in exchange for Israel’s withdrawal from the Sinai, which Golda Meir firmly rejected. Therefore, what made it necessary for Egypt to resolve conflict with Israel through diplomatic means was not Israel’s nuclear option but Egypt’s domestic circumstances in the aftermath of the 1967 war.
It was, in fact, Israel’s change of stance on its uncompromising positions that, ultimately, made peace possible. Specifically, the aftermath of the 1973 war resulted in Israel’s realisation of its limitations and led to the understanding that compromise with Egypt was necessary. The 1973 war had deeply shocked the Israelis as it had caught them off guard, as well as involving massive military losses and casualties. The Arab attack showed that Egypt, despite of Israel’s nuclear option, was determined to regain control of its territory even if it was forced to do so through war. Whilst in 1971 Israel saw no need to consider Sadat’s peace proposal and make concessions from a position of strength, the 1973 war had exposed Israel’s vulnerabilities, prompting it to question its uncompromising attitudes and policies of settlement expansion in Arab lands and to favour peace and stability. This can be seen in the decision of the Israelis to turn against the hardline posture of their leadership and to vote for a different government led by Begin, who signed the landmark peace agreement in 1979 with Sadat, in which Israel agreed to withdraw from the Sinai. What played a vital role in enhancing Israel’s security through the Egypt-Israel peace agreement was therefore Israel’s diplomatic drive to normalise relations with the Arabs, rather than its nuclear option.
Nonetheless, it can be argued that Israel’s nuclear option may have given Israel the required confidence to make the territorial concessions that made the 1979 peace possible. Having experienced the Holocaust and marking its entrance through a war against the Arabs, Israel has developed a ‘persecution mentality’ that has translated into a persistent feeling of insecurity. Indeed, it was this deep feeling of insecurity that motivated President Ben Gurion to embark on Israel’s nuclear project. The fact that Israel has historically been reluctant to engage in diplomatic efforts with the Arabs, can also be explained by Israel’s obsessive fears and anxieties. Thus, with Israel’s historical background in mind, it seems reasonable to argue that Israel’s nuclear weapons may have played an indirect role in achieving its security because they made it easier for the Jewish state to make the required concessions in the 1979 peace process. But whilst its nuclear option was arguably a necessary condition for Israel’s willingness to pay a territorial price for peace, it was hardly a sufficient one. This can be said by considering how, as noted above, Israel refused to make any type of compromise when Sadat had made a peace proposal in 1971, despite having the nuclear option at that time. Rather, it took the shock of the 1973 war to persuade Israel that compromise was required. Thus, whilst nuclear weapons may have played an implicit role in the Arab-Israeli peace process and, consequently, in strengthening Israel’s security, they were hardly a decisive factor.
The Doubtful Role of Israel’s Nuclear Weapons in Deterring a Joint Arab Attack
If Israel’s nuclear weapons did not contribute to what was the steppingstone of the Arab-Israel reconciliation, it may still be argued that they have nonetheless played an important role in strengthening Israel’s security by deterring a joint Arab attack. After all, Israel remains a small state surrounded by an Arab world that has historically expressed hostility towards Israel.
However, whilst this argument does seem to make instinctive sense, on closer inspection, it is flawed. This is not only because there is no evidence that there has been an Arab intention to engage in a joint effort to destroy Israel but also because such effort does not appear to have been in the interests of many Arab states. As for the first point, Maoz has shown how Arab states have not invested the resources that would be needed for such an attack. He notes how since the 1979 Israel-Egypt peace agreement, Egypt has reduced its defence expenditure from 22 percent in 1974 to 2.75 percent in 2002. Similarly, Syria’s defence expenditure is about 6.7 percent of its gross domestic product in 2002, compared to 26 percent in 1986, and Israel’s defence expenditure is far higher than the combined defence expenditures of Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon.
Indeed, it could be said that the reason why Arab states have not invested in a joint attack against Israel is precisely because of Israel’s nuclear deterrent. However, it is arguably the case that many Arab states have let go of their long-standing commitment to destroy the Jewish state because they have learned that ending confrontations with Israel can be in their strategic interests. In particular, given the close US-Israel alliance, many Arab states have sought to reduce tensions with Israel as an indirect means through which to strengthen their own security ties with the US. This line of reasoning can be seen in Egypt during the American-Egyptian dialogue of the early 1960s that took place in relation to Israel’s advancing nuclear capabilities. The dialogue saw Nasser committing to the US proposal of applying constraints on Egypt’s nuclear options, thus showing how Egypt’s concern with improving its relations with the US overrode its interest in military confrontations with Israel. The benefit for Egypt of forming friendly relations with Israel was later reflected in the aftermath of the Egypt-Israel peace agreement, which saw Egypt becoming the second-largest recipient of U.S. economic aid and military assistance. Similarly, following the 1994 Israel-Jordan peace treaty, Jordan has used the friendly relations with Israel to improve its ties with Western governments and international financial institutions, which are an important source of economic and military assistance for Jordan. It thus seems to be the case that an important reason why Arab states have restrained from confrontations with Israel is because of their concern with strengthening relations with the US rather than because of Israel’s nuclear deterrent. This suggests that Israel’s close alliance with the US has played a more significant role in deterring an all-out Arab attack on Israel than its possession of nuclear weapons.
Israel’s Nuclear Weapons in the Context of the International Non-Proliferation Regime
The doubtful role of nuclear weapons in achieving security for Israel can also be seen by considering the particular implications of Israel’s nuclear policy on its security in the context of the International Non-proliferation Regime. International non-proliferation treaties have increasingly led Arab states to perceive Israel as an aggressive actor, which has created a sense of regional insecurity that undermines prospects of non-proliferation, thus, threatening Israel’s security. The introduction of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT) in 1970 has changed ideas and perceptions around nuclear weapons over time. Indeed, the NPT has led many states to view nuclear weapons in a negative light. Whilst nuclear weapons were initially viewed as a sign of prestige, from around the 1990s they have increasingly been viewed as something that ‘rogue states’ desire. This renewed conceptualisation of nuclear weapons suggests that whilst in earlier decades Arab states may have tended to view Israel’s nuclear capabilities as part of a last resort defensive strategy, they have increasingly come to perceive them as more of a threat. This can be seen by considering the recent intolerance within the region of Israel’s nuclear monopoly and in growing Arab pressures for a WMD free-zone in the Middle East.
This increasing distrust towards Israel’s nuclear capabilities suggests that eventually, if Israel does not disarm, it is likely that Arab states are going to seek the acquisition of nuclear weapons as a security measure against the perceived Israeli threat, thus, in turn, threatening Israel’s own security. This dynamic is arguably already taking place, with Iran’s recent growing nuclear aspirations and Saudi Arabia expressing interest in developing a nuclear arsenal if Iran obtains one being a case in point. It thus seems to be the case that Israel’s nuclear weapons, far from achieving security for Israel, are actually undermining it by encouraging nuclear proliferation in the region. Arguably Iran is only held back from the final step of developing its own nuclear weapon by the constraints imposed by an aging Supreme Leader, who regards weapons of mass destruction with suspicion. Should he die, the constraints on the development of an Iranian nuclear weapon are arguably removed.
The Bottom Line: Nuclear Shield or Nuclear Illusion?
Overall, it can be concluded that nuclear weapons have not truly enhanced the security of the Jewish state. Rather, the above historical analysis suggests that Israel’s long-term security may depend more on a sustained diplomatic drive than on its deterrent capabilities.
Whilst it is often assumed that Israel’s nuclear weapons have enhanced Israel’s security by compelling Arab leaders to accept its existence and begin a process of reconciliation, the start of the Arab-Israel peace process had little to do with Israel’s nuclear weapons. The 1967 war created the incentives for peace by weakening Egypt and making continued confrontations with Israel unsustainable, whilst the trauma of the 1973 war pushed Israel to re-evaluate its uncompromising stance and engage in diplomatic efforts.
At first glance, the conflictual history of Arab-Israel relations seems to suggest that Israel’s nuclear weapons have been key for its security by deterring the Arabs from any thoughts of a ‘decisive battle’. Yet, the lack of military investment by the Arabs suggests that they have longed abandoned the goal of destroying the Jewish state and that they have come to realise the benefits of maintaining friendly ties with what is a key US ally.
Finally, in the context of the International Non-Proliferation regime, Israel’s nuclear weapons may actually pose a risk to its security; shifting perceptions around nuclear weapons caused by non-proliferation treaties have led the Arab world to increasingly perceive Israel’s nuclear option as a sign of aggression, which is fuelling a hardened defensive stance by the Arabs that paves the way to nuclear proliferation in the region, thus, potentially threatening Israel’s security.
Fast-forwarding to the October 7 attacks, we are once again reminded of the limits of military power. Deterrence, whether nuclear or conventional, cannot be a substitute for a diplomatic policy. Rather than relying solely on force, it is imperative that Israel also pursues diplomatic measures, such as opening a dialogue for a two-state solution, which can help prevent radicalisation amongst the Palestinian population and diminish popular support for extremist groups like Hamas. By addressing underlying grievances and prioritizing diplomacy over military force, Israel can work toward a more sustainable peace that ultimately enhances its long-term security.
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