Our NCF Senior Fellow, Dr Neil Partrick, has put together a fascinating blog gauging the implications of the ‘bridge’ developed by China, in hope of forging a new and peaceful relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
Some interesting points are raised:
- Assessing the true impact on the war in Yemen, between the internationally recognised Saudi-backed Yemen government and the “Iranian-backed” Ansr Allah movement…
- The hyperbolised might of China’s military presence and what this means for the JCPOA nuclear deal going forward…
- Syrian security concerns regarding the Saudi-Iranian deal and what this might mean for armaments for Damascus. Assad then meets with Vladimir Putin…
- The implications of normalisation with the Gulf States for Israel and how Israel might utilise long-standing Israeli-Chinese relations to achieve their strategic goals…
For the full blog, click the link to Dr Partrick’s website here:
https://www.neilpartrick.com/blog/china-s-bridge-won-t-transcend-the-gulf
An unnamed Saudi official says that President Xi has made it clear to Riyadh that he wants to be a ‘bridge’ between Riyadh and Tehran. Yet the recent headline-grabbing diplomatic ‘deal’ of March 11 that some are dubbing ‘tripartite’, says little and may represent even less given that its sponsor hasn’t the capacity to tackle the issues of substance between the two rival regional powers. Nor, yet at least, does China possess the military weight and political patronage in the region that would enable any Chinese admonishment of the parties to have real clout. China has money but, like other potential mediators, has economic and political challenges in its own region. China is also a needy customer of these two major oil suppliers as much as it’s a perceived benefactor for Iran and some of the smaller conflict states of the region. In 2021 the Iranian regime had already theoretically thrown its nationalist credentials out of the window by trading with China the Iranian people’s key asset – hydrocarbons – for the promise of widespread investment and goods with which to try to pacify them. But the eye-watering value of reciprocal investment and development that China claims it will make in Iran under the 25 year hydrocarbon agreement, is proving highly contentious, not least in Iran itself.
President Xi though looks like he’s on a roll – at least if you’re bounced by modern news cycles. Xi has just begun a three day visit to Russia where he’ll present his 12 Point Plan to end the Ukraine war to President Putin. Unlike China’s underwriting of the rapprochement deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia however, Xi is reportedly not planning on practising meaningful diplomacy to the extent of also meeting with President Zelensky. (However, dependent on the outcome of his meeting with Putin, a follow-up Xi visit to Ukraine is perhaps not impossible).
Xi’s Ukraine-Russia plan though does have more going for it than its almost automatic rejection by the Biden White House would suggest. China has not been a wholly neutral party in the current phase of the historic Russian-Ukrainian conflict. On the one hand it’s reportedly supplied potentially dual-use components to Russia, and been a self-interested consumer of its discounted oil. On the other, China has subtly but publicly indicated its discomfort at the threat of the war turning nuclear. What mediator of substance is ‘neutral’ anyway, it might be asked. For example there are hopes that Turkey could get beyond its successful grain diplomacy (that deal was renewed March 17 albeit for a disputed time period). However Ankara is a NATO member, leveraging that role to decide who gets to join an Atlantic Alliance that’s expanding thanks to Putin, and commensurate with Ankara’s own perceived national security concerns. Turkey cannot rely on Russia to uphold such Turkish concerns vis-a-vis Syria’s Kurds for instance. Turkey has also aided the Ukrainian war effort by continuing extant supplies of its marketable Bayrakdar drone.
