This report sets down a perspective formed by some members of the Next Century Foundation, following the fourth working group meeting in the current series held on the situation in Russia and Ukraine. This does not necessarily represent the perspective of the Board and members of the NCF.
The steps to peace require initial talks from officials on either side with the goal of diplomatic involvement to engage further discussion of solutions. In this statement we have tried not to be prescriptive, but to suggest a wide range of ideas for initiating diplomatic discussion.
International security and stability of Europe
Since the current Russian incursion into Ukraine began on the 24th of February 2022, the echoed effects of the conflict have impacted the global community. This conflict has disturbed the stability and security of many European states, which are still be experiencing the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic, with rising inflation rates boosted by an over-dependence on Russian gas and oil exports. The echoed consequences are penalising populations right across Europe.
We also acknowledge the impact that the conflict has on the security concerns of other states that border Russia, such as Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Understandably, their fear is heightened as they perceive themselves at risk should the conflict widen. We believe this should further highlight the importance of the international community in initiating and supporting peace talks with direct involvement of the parties, through the initial negotiation of a ceasefire. We envision one of the main aims of a resolution to this conflict as being a united and safe Europe. We also importantly note, for any peace negotiation to occur, the use of weapons and artillery must be paused in order to cause no further destruction to people’s lives and the infrastructure of both nations.
Acknowledgement of the Minsk agreements
Following the eight-year contestation over the Donbas region, the 2015 Minsk agreements[1] were negotiated twice between Kyiv and Moscow in an attempt to neutralise military and political points. Unfortunately, the Minsk agreements were both not acted upon as Ukraine was unwilling or unable to rule out joining NATO. Apart from Emmanuel Macron’s attempts to defuse tension, we saw little international effort to avoid conflict in Ukraine. We recommend that some elements from these agreements should be the basis of a future agreement between Ukraine and Russia, with further involvement of external mediators in this context, alongside more serious sanctions if breached.
Nuclear possibilities
Also of note is the threat of a nuclear disaster in Zaporizhzhia, the largest nuclear power plant in Europe. The use of the environs at the Zaporizhzhia power plant as a base from which to carry out attacks is an alarming threat as the location and strikes could result in a large-scale explosion. We therefore further stress the importance of a ceasefire in this region in prevention of possible harm to vast populations.
Verbal Tutzig
We endorse calls for Ukraine to honour the Tutzig formula[2] which is known to be a verbal commitment initially given by Germany to the former USSR, concerning former Soviet Union nations such as Ukraine would not join NATO as a reflection of the security concerns of Russia. We acknowledge this agreement has been contested and many ex-Soviet states have joined NATO but considering the large Russian population of the Donbas we feel it appropriate for Ukraine to honour this agreement. In other respects, Ukraine’s desire for a direct relationship with the West should be honoured by Russia.
Crimea and its complexities
The recent explosion of the Crimea bridge has triggered the missile response by Russia launching strikes at several Ukrainian cities. We recommend Ukraine avoid seeking the contestation of Russia’s hegemony over the Crimean Peninsula. This recommendation is in the context of the historical past of the region in its role during the Russian Empire and its annexation in 1952 and most recently in 2014, in view of the fact that the majority of its current population is Russian.
It is important to acknowledge in this report that the 2022 annexation referendum in the occupied territories in Ukraine was recently contested. The referendum holds no international recognition because during the referendum hundreds of thousands were not present to cast a vote having fled these areas, as well as this, heavy military presence in these regions would appear to be unsafe enough for a ballot. The high figure of votes in favour of Russia is questioned by various stakeholders globally, some describing the referendum as a ‘sham’ and a ‘falsified’ result. Independent election monitoring is the key to more peaceful territorial negotiations. Therefore, the Next Century Foundation request the United Nations to initiate an independent referendum to determine territorial status.
Donbas solutions
We call on both Ukraine and Russia to regard the Donbas as autonomous in its status. This would involve both Russian and Ukrainian joint control of Luhansk and Donetsk. The coal basin area serves as a significant industrial area which both nations have held power over, and it is only sound to regard the people as educated enough to apply to whichever sovereign state they wish to belong to in regard to issues such as voting rights, passports and ID cards. Moreover, we suggest the option of dual nationality as another solution for the people of these regions as seen in the context of Northern Ireland.
Therefore, we put forward the notion of accepting the concept of a cooperative territorial arrangement over the Donbas region between both Russia and Ukraine as an initial solution. These regions have critical energy assets that are vulnerable military targets. The considerable environmental damage from war risks many lives. Hence, the organisation requests that these regions should be declared as demilitarised zones to protect not only the lives of people, but also protect the vulnerable ecosystem on a much larger scale.
Humanitarian aid
We note the pause of crucial humanitarian operations to be detrimental to individuals residing where bombardment and artillery is faced in cities, towns and villages in Ukraine following the suspected-Ukrainian attack on the Crimea bridge. The Norwegian Refugee Council states they were unable to operate when the strikes began on October 10th, 2022, and as a result, more aid is required to reach new areas which have been affected recently. We, therefore, call on local partners in the affected areas to prioritise acknowledgement of organisations’ failure of providing critical aid.
We acknowledge that the priority for Ukraine is maintaining humanitarian operations. After the explosion on the Crimea bridge, 30% of power stations in Ukraine have been destroyed by airstrikes. Since the conflict began, the total electricity generation in Ukraine has dropped by approximately 45%. People who are involved in the conflict have to face the most difficult winter this year and with the conflict developing, many lives will be at stake. To support international humanitarian aid, the European Commission of the region is trying to keep in touch with local Ukrainian partners. On behalf of a large list of district centres, the Ukrainian Association of District and Regional Council sent a request for supplies to international organisations. We urge cooperation between international organisations and local partners to support all affected civilians.
War prisoners
The Third Geneva Convention obliges all parties in an international armed conflict to provide access to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)[3]. Immediate access to the prisoners of war (POW) and the right to visit them wherever they are situated is also ensured by this convention. However, the ICRC are unable to gain access to many prisons like Olenivka, where POWs are held due to practical access issues. As of the 23rd of August 2022, the Russian Federation along with affiliated armed groups in Donetsk were planning to attempt to try Ukrainian POWs in Mariupol, which was being labelled as an ‘international tribunal’. International law prohibits the establishment of courts formed exclusively for prosecuting individuals who are defined as a ‘prisoners-of-war’. Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of August 12th, 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1)[4] individuals who are given prisoner-of-war status have combatant immunity. They cannot be prosecuted for engaging in hostilities or war crimes during the period of conflict. There have been statements from Russian officials who are labelling Ukrainian POWs as ‘war criminals’, ‘Nazis’, and ‘terrorists’. International Humanitarian law also prohibits the establishment of the courts particularly to try the prisoner of war. This deprives such individuals from their right to fair trial. Such infringement if done wilfully does amount to a war crime.
With contribution from both parties and external mediators, this paper concludes its discussion on the possibility of resolving the current points of conflict. And with each minute the conflict continues, we expect further sudden developments in the areas of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson. The Next Century Foundation reiterates its concern over the detrimental consequences to both sides and the rest of Europe from prolonged conflict between the two neighbours.
/ends . . .
The second edition of this report has been prepared by all current team members at the Next Century Foundation.
[1] The Minsk agreements were a series of agreements discussed in 2014 and 2015 between Kyiv and Moscow.
Minsk agreement I – 12-point deal signed September 2014 in Minsk, Belarus, requesting as echoed by President Petro Poroshenko’s previous recommended peace plan: an OSCE-monitored ceasefire; an exchange of prisoners; the withdrawal of ‘armed formations, military equipment and fighters and mercenaries’ from Ukraine; the establishment of an OSCE-monitored ‘security zone’ along the border; and an economic reconstruction programme for Donbas. (Chatham House, 2020)
Minsk agreement II – 13-point deal signed in February 2015 by representatives from Ukraine and Russia, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the leaders of separatist-held regions Donetsk and Luhansk. This second agreement was supported by France and Germany. The drafting of this agreement was hasty as it was required quickly to dissolve the Donbas war, calling on: immediate and comprehensive ceasefire; withdrawal of heavy weapons by both parties; OSCE monitoring; dialogue on interim self-government for Donetsk and Luhansk, in accordance with Ukrainian law, and acknowledgement of special status by parliament; pardon and amnesty for fighters; exchange of hostages and prisoners; humanitarian assistance; resumption of socioeconomic ties; Ukraine to restore control of state border; withdrawal of foreign armed formations, military equipment, mercenaries; constitutional reform in Ukraine including decentralisation, with specific mention of Donetsk and Luhansk; elections in Donetsk and Luhansk; and to intensify Trilateral Contact Group’s work including representatives of Russia, Ukraine and OSCE. (Al Jazeera, 2022)
[2] Tutzig formula – verbal ‘understandings’ established by the U.S. Secretary of State James Baker on not seeking further NATO expansion towards former Soviet Union states in his meeting with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev on February 9, 1990. Earlier promises were given by U.S. President George Bush in reassuring Gorbachev during the Malta summit in December 1989 that the U.S. would not seek advantage of the revolutions in East Europe at the time to disrupt Soviet interests. Further concrete assurances were given in 1990 by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, French leader Francois Mitterrand and West German foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher with Gorbachev, President of the Soviet Union. (National Security Archive, 2017).
[3] COMMENTARY OF 2020
Article 12 – Responsibility for the treatment of prisoners and conditions for their transfer to another power
(1) Prisoners of war are in the hands of the enemy Power, but not of the individuals or military units who have captured them. Irrespective of the individual responsibilities that may exist, the Detaining Power is responsible for the treatment given to them.
(2) Prisoners of war may only be transferred by the Detaining Power to a Power which is a party to the Convention and after the Detaining Power has satisfied itself of the willingness and ability of such transferee Power to apply the Convention. When prisoners of war are transferred under such circumstances, responsibility for the application of the Convention rests on the Power accepting them while they are in its custody.
(3) Nevertheless, if that Power fails to carry out the provisions of the Convention in any important respect, the Power by whom the prisoners of war were transferred shall, upon being notified by the Protecting Power, take effective measures to correct the situation or shall request the return of the prisoners of war. Such requests must be complied with.
[4] Article 10 – Protection and care
1. All the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, to whichever Party they belong, shall be respected and protected.
2. In all circumstances they shall be treated humanely and shall receive, to the fullest extent practicable and with the least possible delay, the medical care and attention required by their condition. There shall be no distinction among them founded on any grounds other than medical ones.
Article 11 – Protection of persons
1. The physical or mental health and integrity of persons who are in the power of the adverse Party or who are interned, detained or otherwise deprived of liberty as a result of a situation referred to in Article 1 shall not be endangered by any unjustified act or omission. Accordingly, it is prohibited to subject the persons described in this Article to any medical procedure which is not indicated by the state of health of the person concerned and which is not consistent with generally accepted medical standards which would be applied under similar medical circumstances to persons who are nationals of the Party conducting the procedure and who are in no way deprived of liberty.
