Since parliamentary elections were held in Iraq in October 2021, there has been political gridlock as parties struggle to form a coalition government or elect a new President. The party elected with the most seats was the Sadrist Movement, led by Shia cleric and militia boss Muqtada al-Sadr. However, on 13th June 2022 all 73 Sadrist members of the Council of Representatives resigned. This was because al-Sadr was frustrated by the difficulty he faced in forming a government in cooperation with allies from some of the other parties. He, arguably with some good reason, had concerns over foreign interference from Iran and the USA (and to a lesser extent but also from the UK and the UN representative in Iraq) in the coalition negotiations, all of whom wanted a government of national unity rather than a winner takes all scenario, particularly since Muqtada al-Sadr was the winner. There are now questions as to who can form a government.
Possible Candidates
One of the candidates still in play and hoping to take power as Premier instead of a al-Sadr nominated individual, is Nouri al-Maliki. He is the current Secretary-General of the Islamic Dawa Party, a predominantly Shiite Party which did reasonably well in the recent elections (Second place after Sadr). Al-Maliki was formerly a two term Prime Minister of Iraq from 2006-18, but the Dawa Party has struggled recently due to divisions within the party. As Prime Minister, he worked closely with the USA in his first term. Less so in his second term. He has been criticised in government for causing friction with Sunnis, which some blame for helping the Islamic State’s rise in the early 2010s.
After a bruising premiership, it is uncertain whether he has even enough support within his own coalition to make a serious bid to form a government, and Americans seem reluctant to back someone who they encouraged to take power in 2014 (he actually came in second place in that election as in this but America persuaded the Kurds to back him for a second term – an act of interference they were to come to regret as al-Malaki’s second term was fraught with trouble).
Another candidate is Hadi al-Amiri. He heads Fatah, a coalition mainly comprised of groups involved within the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF). The PMF has been been both a bulwark against Daish and a source of violence on the Shiite street, especially during the recent 2019-21 protests in Iraq, with one of the protests’ aims to end the corrupt political system which the PMF has underpinned. Elements of the PMF have been an instrument of Iran’s foreign policy, and there are concerns of conflict between the PMF and Iraq’s more traditional military.
The West might agree to a Fatah government, even though they have been responsible for attacks on Western embassies. A closer relationships with Iran would isolated Iraq diplomatically, and also not be popular with many Iraqis. However Hadi al-Amri has been discreetly courting the West, and assuring the US that he will take a more nuanced position if he gains power. Fatah lost over half of its seats in the 2021 elections, leading to al-Amiri calling the elections “fabricated”. It is unlikely that he could achieve the majority in parliament needed to take the Premiership without significant Western backing.
Al-Sadr: the cleric’s gamble
It is also important not to rule out Al-Sadr. For the Sadrist parliamentarians to mass-resign does not mean a retreat from politics, but a move to more visible displays of political power, through mass protests rather than backroom negotiations, though some have seen this move as a way to demonstrate the Sadrist movement’s power and increase its bargaining power. To understand the popular appeal of al-Sadr, it is important to look at where al-Sadr’ support comes from.
Al-Sadr is part of a dynasty of Shia clerics, with his father Mohammad al-Sadr having been a vocal opponent of Saddam Hussein. Mohammad al-Sadr, at the time based in Baghdad, appealed to poor, radical Shiites. Over time, Mohammad built up strong personal loyalty amongst his followers.
Muqtada became leader of the Sadrist movement after Mohammad’s killing in 1999. Muqtada formed an armed wing of the Sadrist movement in 2003, called the Mahdi Army, which has clashed with American Coalition forces, as well as other Shia groups. This has limited al-Sadr’s ability to work with other parties in Iraq, despite similarities, such as al-Sadr struggling to find support among other Shia Islamist groups. Frustration with the lack of progress in making a coalition has led the Sadrists to increasingly rely on ‘people power’, which could lead to conflicts between Sadrists and the state, as well as between Sadrists and other militia groups.
Possibility of compromise?
However extraordinary it may seem, none the less the winners of the Iraq elections, the Sadrists, have withdrawn. It is unlikely either of the two candidates listed could form a parliamentary coalition with one of them in charge. There could be compromise between several parties behind a more neutral candidate. Compromise has happened in the past, such as after the 2018 election. However, the Prime Minister who came to power after that election later had to resign due to anti-corruption protests from 2019-21. Al-Sadr has been increasingly critical of Iraq’s elites ever since and this has led to him being described as a populist by Western commentators. Dismissing al-Sadr in such a way could be dangerous, in isolating both a powerful bloc within Iraqi politics as well as ignoring the concerns of many working-class Iraqis.
The street protestors believed that revenues from oil sales were not being fairly distributed by what they regarded as a corrupt government.
Iraq’s social instability seems more difficult to deal with through policies. Kurds continue to wield significant power within the Iraqi state, whilst many Kurds are simultaneously trying to create an independent Kurdistan. The West doesn’t have a good solution to this problem, as NATO member Turkey would protest any attempt to create an independent Kurdistan as a threat to its own sovereignty due to Kurds making up a demographic majority of several Eastern provinces of Turkey. In Iraq, the USA tried to follow a policy of ‘nation creation’, which has failed to deal with the fractured Iraq nation that was already present before the intervention.
International Issues for Iraq
Divisions within parliament reflect conflicts that have plagued Iraq throughout its history: between Sunnis and Shias; between Arabs and Kurds; between secularists and Islamists. However, it is important not to dichotomise Iraqi politics – there are a lot of blurred lines and gray areas. Whilst Iraq is caught in the ‘Middle Eastern Cold War’ between Iran and Saudi Arabia, al-Sadr’s warm relations with Saudi Arabia go against the typical Manichaean view that Iran vs Saudi Arabia is a conflict between Shias and Sunnis.
Identity is important in the sectarian breakdown of Iraq, but so too is personality. Politics in Iraq is often defined by the leaders of the various factions (whether they be parties, militias, or commonly a hybrid between the two), and the relations between them. Al-Sadr’s moves in meeting with Saudi and Emirati officials can be seen as an attempt to expand appeal at home, but also as a power play to gather international support when many other Shia leaders are competing for support from Iranians.
It is likely that any Iraq government will need continued Western support to prop it up, yet counter-intuitively it seems important that Iraq keep some distance from the West, both economically and politically.
Economically, much of Iraq was privatised during the 2000s, and for working class grievances to be addressed, greater state provision of services would likely help, though Iraq’s current corrupt government could lead to the continuance of clientelism rather than equal access to state services.
Politicians often face criticism for too close-relations to the USA and Iran – what is needed is a true Iraqi nationalist. Al-Sadr seems to have taken a strong Iraqi nationalist bent of late, through moving Iraq closer to other Arab states rather than the religiously similar but ethnically different Iran. Distance from Iran is important, as Iranian backed militias have been a threat to the stability of Iraq.
That said, Iranian-backed militias have provided a lot of the services that would have been expected of a functioning state, such as supplying food and fuel to the poor. An Iraq government that the West can see as successful must be ideologically palatable, but also effective in servicing the basic needs of the Iraqi people.
Who to back
To prevent the continuance of militia dominated politics, the West could back al-Maliki once again, although his negative history could encourage the West to try and find an alternate leader within his coalition. Iraq’s politics favours strongman leaders, frequently those who also have a militia backing them, and it seems unlikely that there could be a leader in the short-term future that could change this pattern.
The kingmaker for the West to exploit in this context may be the secularist (and Sunni) Progress Party leader, the current Speaker of the Council of Representatives, Mohamed al-Halbousi. He may hold the balance when it comes to deciding between Malaki and Al Amri. But we should all be cautious about getting excited, American attempts to establish a liberal democratic state in the past has led to the corrupt authoritarian Iraq we have today.
Many both in the West and in Iraq would want Iraq to move away from its inherently sectarian politics, though without each demographic group feeling like they have a slice of the pie, it is unlikely that there will be a peaceful Iraq. One can hope that there is a move towards a politics based upon a united Iraq identity; a politics that is divided by ideology rather than identity.
