The end of the 11-day war between Hamas and Israel has once again raised hopes of a prisoner exchange between the two sides. Yet, if Palestinian groups remain in deadlock, will the new, stronger Israeli government keep Palestine’s cause célèbre, Marwan Barghouti, in prison? And would Fatah, and most particularly Hamas, actually rather he stayed in prison anyway in view of the threat to their hegemony his popularity represents?
Prisoner exchanges are often described as an important step towards sustainable peace. Encouraged by sentiments of honour, loyalty and dignity, they have the power to soothe tensions between opposing sides with almost immediate effect. Thus, following a tenuous ceasefire with Israel, Hamas’ expression of optimism for a prisoner exchange seems like a positive development. As Hamas leader Yehiyeh Sinwar said, ‘there is a real chance to make progress’. Yet prisoner exchange has a unique characteristic: it is both a site of peace and a site of conflict. Emotions run as high as the prices paid, and the demands of both sides often carry significant political weight.
The last exchange occurred in 2011: Hamas was able to negotiate an unprecedented deal, swapping 1,027 Palestinian prisoners for soldier Gilad Shalit, the highest price Israel has ever paid for one person. This was despite the fact that the released Palestinians were collectively responsible for 569 Israeli deaths. Currently, Hamas holds two Israeli citizens and the bodies of two IDF soldiers. The soldiers, Oron Shaul and Hadar Goldin, were killed in action during the 2014 war, whilst the civilians, Avner Mengistu and Hisham al-Sayed, are believed to have crossed voluntarily into Gaza after being released from Israeli army service due to serious mental health conditions.
Despite a general willingness to resolve the issue of the four Israelis, differing solutions have led to an impasse. Whereas the Israeli Defense Minister, Benny Gantz, has said that Israel is “willing to help with fixing the [Gaza] area, rebuilding it” depending on the progress of the prisoner exchange, Hamas official, Khalil al-Haya, has explicitly stated that they “will not accept the prisoner file being tied to the reconstruction, or the siege, or Palestinian rights”. Rather, Hamas wants to swap their prisoners for Palestinian prisoners: in April 2020, they included on this exchange list elderly, female and child prisoners as well as prisoners rearrested after being released in 2011. Yehiyeh Sinwar somewhat cryptically suggested the number came to 1,111 people in total. In fact, in a statement released after Egypt’s intelligence chief Abbas Kamel visited Gaza, Khalil al-Haya was more interested in discussing the terms of “calm and stability” than prisoner exchange, demanding an end to Israeli aggression and the blockade on the Gaza strip; the establishment of a Palestinian state; and a solution to the issue of Palestinian refugees.
Israel was already unlikely to agree to this separation of the prisoner exchange from ceasefire negotiations, and the recent change of government has only hardened that position. Prime Minister Naftali Bennett stated in 2016 his firm opposition to exchanges, even suggesting kidnapping “Arab terrorists” to avoid releasing Palestinian prisoners. It is telling that his first act in power was to allow the controversial Jerusalem Flag March and then within three days, abandon Benjamin Netanyahu’s “quiet for quiet” policy to bomb Gaza. More importantly, his appointment resolves the political uncertainty of Israel which had been creating opportunities for prisoner exchange in the first place: in 2019, 2020 and May 2021, the Israeli government wanted the publicity of a successful deal but now it is not so motivated to engage with Hamas.
The divided Palestinian movement contributes to their weakening bargaining position. Despite Egypt’s attempts to bring together Fatah and Hamas last week, the meeting was postponed after Hamas rejected proposals from the Fatah delegation, including a formation of a national unity government, Gaza reconstruction under the supervision of the Palestinian Authority and an agreement to avoid discussion of the PLO. Ironically, the one person who has the potential to unite the Palestinian groups is subject to the prisoner exchange: Marwan Barghouti. A veteran Palestinian activist, Barghouti was heavily involved in the first and second intifada, and even since his imprisonment in 2002, has remained a key figure in Palestinian politics. He co-authored the National Conciliation Document of the Prisoners in 2006 which was signed by major Palestinian groups including Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. If he were to be released, he could unite the Palestinian movement, especially since opinion polls show he would be the most popular candidate.
Yet his popularity makes him a threat to both Fatah and Hamas. Having advocated a campaign of passive resistance as a third intifada, some in Israel think he poses a distinct danger to Israel’s stability. If he were to challenge Mahmoud Abbas for the presidency of the Palestinian Authority, he would likely win. Even Hamas, who could gain favour in the West Bank if they secure his release, seem nervous of stronger competition. Despite Hamas describing Barghouti as being at ‘the top of the list’ for exchange and assuring his wife Fadwa of their efforts as recently as last week, many think this is political posturing rather than real intent.
Worryingly, there appears to be only one thing uniting Hamas, Fatah and Israel on the topic of prisoner exchange: some people must stay in prison.
