Making up more than 10% of the population, and controlling almost 20% of Syria’s territory, the Kurds play a crucial role in shaping Syria’s future. Kurds though feel deeply uncertain about their own future in Syria.
Rojava, the Kurdish autonomous region, faces multiple threats. The new transitional government of Syria under Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an avowedly Islamist group, wants to unite the country again, raising fears of an Arab-dominated government with no space for the Kurds. Meanwhile a renewed offensive by the Turkish-backed militia faction that calls itself the Syrian National Army attacking from West to East across the Euphrates seems to have no end in sight, the Syrian militia faction and Turkey (its backer) emboldened by the United States’ ongoing recalibration of its foreign policy. Can Rojava keep its hard-fought cultural autonomy?
Previous Negotiations
Relations between HTS and Rojava were understandably sour before the 8th December 2024. HTS is an Islamist organisation that had been designated as terrorist by multiple western countries. It does not fit well with Rojava or its military arm, the SDF, that had been on the front lines against ISIS until its “defeat” in 2019. The situation can be confusing. The SDF or Syrian Democratic Forces is a rebranding of the Kurdish militia called the YPG as a Kurdish-led coalition of rebel groups a sprinkling of local Arab tribal militias in Syria. It was cobbled together by the USA in 2015 as a rebel alliance during the Syrian civil war. The SDF is the official military wing of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria. The SDF is allied with the United States. The PYD or Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat is the main political party in Kurdish Syria. For political reasons it is often deliberately confused with the PKK in Turkey (the Wikipedia entry is COMPLETELY inaccurate). The military wing of the PYD are the People’s Defense Units or Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (YPG).
When the Assad government collapsed under an HTS-led offensive in December 2024, the new government under Ahmed al-Sharaa gave encouraging signs that the new government would be both more inclusive and freer than the previous nominally Baathist government. Western analysts and spectators were very positive about al-Sharaa, as seen by the visits made to Syria by the German and French foreign ministers in December, even while HTS was still designated as a terrorist group.
These preliminary good feelings were shared by the Kurds of Syria. Early negotiations between al-Sharaa’s government and the Democratic Union Party (PYD) dominated Rojava seemed to be going well. Rojavan lawmakers were quick to clearly state that they still believed themselves Syrian, that they weren’t angling for a way to secede fully but wanted their autonomous status legally recognised. The SDF leader was one of the first Syrian notables that al-Sharaa met in person. Furthermore, the ceasefire between HTS aligned forces and the SDF had held.
Unfortunately, the HTS did not agree with the autonomy the PYD (and its proxy the SDF) wanted and instead demanded that the SDF (Syrian Democratic Force) would be folded into a new Syrian military. This was rejected roundly by the SDF. Full scale integration into a new national army would likely mean breaking up existing SDF formations, which would dilute the combat potential of the SDF. The SDF wanted to join the army as a military bloc, wherein their formations would stay the same but be nominally under the control of Al-Sharaa’s government. Al-Sharaa’s government wants to split up non HTS forces so that past loyalties to other groups are diluted amidst the rank and file of a new ‘non-political’ Syrian Army.
Current Situation
Currently, the integration of the SDF into the new Syrian Army is in-name only at best and in reality has failed. As the Turkish-backed SNA continues to assault SDF held towns and villages throughout northern Syria, the SDF have had no incentives to take the HTS’ demands seriously. Al-Sharaa’s government has failed to outline its own plans to defend Rojava from Turkey and the SNA, undoubtedly because Turkey has heavily backed the al-Sharaa government. In light of this, handing over control of their armed forces to the HTS controlled government would be irresponsible.
It is highly unlikely that the SDF will disarm and comply with the National Dialogue Conference’s February 26th announcement that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has a monopoly on the use of force in Syria. The SDF were not invited to the conference, worsening relations between the two organisations.
On the 27th February, Abdullah Ocalan, the imprisoned PKK leader, called for ‘all groups’ to ‘lay down their arms’ and that ‘the PKK must dissolve itself.’ The PYD leadership (though not alluded to by Ocalan) responded to Ocalan’s statements, saying that they refused to lay down their arms as they weren’t PKK and that the SNA were still attacking their positions, making disarmament a non-starter.
The fighting is still continuing as we speak, with no signs of de-escalation. Turkey and the SNA believe they have a free hand to deal with what they mischaracterise as a PKK offshoot. The Trump administration’s foreign policy has been ambiguous regarding the US position towards its troops in Rojava, which must embolden Turkey and the SNA in their current operations. As President Trump already attempted a pullout in 2018, there is little reason to believe he wouldn’t try again. Moreover, Turkey is a NATO ally, a major regional power, and the main backer of the HTS. On the other hand, the SDF had no reason to give up fighting. Before Rojava’s establishment, Syrian Kurds were discriminated against heavily in Syria; often denied citizenship, the right to school education in Kurdish, sometimes even the ability to give their children Kurdish names. There is still no guarantee the HTS will honour their minority rights should they disarm or surrender. The SNA were accused of war crimes in previous fighting in 2019 in Afrin; the fighting then displaced 100,000 people. The SDF have no reason to believe the SNA will act any differently if they seize more territory.
What does the future hold?
It is easy to feel pessimistic for Syrian Kurds, considering the continued fighting and recent sidelining of Kurdish organisations by the HTS. The situation though is drastically better than it would have been in early December. Al-Sharaa appears to be committed to charting a new path for Syria, his National Dialogue Conference having invited over 600 Syrian politicians and community leaders, including one or two Assad government exiles and dissidents living abroad. Furthermore, the PYD and SDF’s rejection of Ocalan’s calls for disarmament, and their own statements, show that Rojava is a Syrian movement, not a trans-national Kurdish project. This should make negotiations easier as neither the HTS or the SDF want to see Syria truly fragmented, even if it currently is in practice, especially in the Turkish and Kurdish dominated north.
Beyond that though, Rojava and HTS share favourable reporting in western media. President al-Sharaa’s Finance Minister was in Davos last month, and as mentioned earlier, Al-Sharaa has met the German and French foreign ministers. It is not unfeasible that negotiations could be smoothed over with western help. Ideologically, on paper at least, both governments arguably support a more inclusive, technocratic model than the Assad administration’s style of governance. In the interest of a reunified Syria, a settlement between the two sides is not out of reach.
Finally, the recent news from Turkey regarding Ocalan and the PKK could be another boon for the Syrian Kurdish. If the PKK can reform into a democratic political party and successfully negotiate peace with the Turkish government, the justifications that Turkey has been using for years to assault the SDF would be undercut. The PKK could also act as a friendly organisation in Turkey for the SDF to lean on. Furthermore the SDF’s own dedication to remaining part of a Syrian nation should dispel fears that Rojava marks the beginning of a transnational Kurdish breakaway state.
