The general elections in Turkey for 2023 are over. Turkey’s president was chosen through two rounds of presidential elections. In parallel, legislative elections were held to choose 600 representatives for the Turkish Grand National Assembly.

With 49.5% of the vote in the first round, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan won. This puzzled analysts and provided a warning: be wary of opinion polls. The secular opposition leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu, his challenger, received 44.9% of the vote. As a result, the electorate in this very divisive nation was divided, with the two sides only 4% apart. In the second round,  Erdoğan only just beat rival Kemal Kilicdaroglu with 52.18 percent of the vote after all ballot boxes in the run-off had been unsealed.

Though Erdoğan has survived through thick and thin, this was one of the biggest tests of his leadership. There was the lingering anger of the public over the government response to the devastating earthquake in February, causing more than 50,000 to lose their lives and an unrecorded number of injuries and vast damage.

The third term of Erdoğan in Turkey will be “a continuation of today,” The nation has returned to authoritarianism under Erdoğan, who first came to power in 2003 as Turkey’s Prime Minister (a position he held for 11 years before being elected President in 2014). Through constitutional amendments, he has increased his hold on power, undermined the democratic institutions of the nation, including the judiciary and the media, and imprisoned opponents and critics, many of whom were journalists.

Turkey – Gulf relations

Historically, Turkey’s foreign policy agenda did not place a lot of emphasis on relations with the Gulf. Turkey opened up to the Middle East during the final decade of the Cold War. Over the past two decades this tie has been no less than a roller coaster. The new assertive foreign policy stance adopted by the Justice and Development Party, particularly after its second term in office, corresponded with the strengthening of Turkey’s ties with the Gulf. With a new foreign policy strategy, Turkey aspired to forge closer economic and political ties with both its immediate neighbours and the areas beyond them.

Saudi Arabia and Turkey have long competed fiercely for influence and leadership in the area. Even when there are friendly ties, this geopolitical reality endures. Under the leadership of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), Saudi Arabia and Turkey are anticipated to pursue ambitious foreign policy objectives. However, this does not automatically suggest that their relationship is becoming worse. It’s interesting to note that despite their rivalry, the two nations have historically engaged in “manageable competition.” Recent efforts at reconciliation suggest that the progress made between them will probably continue.

Additionally, Turkey and the Gulf states took steps to expand their relationship through strategic discussion. Both parties expressed interest in engaging in policy coordination and in identifying shared positions on regional issues of mutual concern in the Middle East, such as the conflict in Iraq, the Palestine-Israel conflict, the internal strife in Lebanon, and the Iranian nuclear programme.

More specifically: Turkish-UAE relations were, in reality, developing quickly when Turkey began its effort to strengthen ties with the GCC before to the Arab Spring. The UAE began investing heavily in Turkey and even became a significant buyer of goods from Turkey’s defence sector as economic ties improved.

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Erdoğan, is set to visit the Gulf shortly. The effects of Erdoğan’s win will extend beyond Turkey’s borders.

Over the next five years, it is anticipated that the Turkish-Saudi partnership would advance in three major areas. The first area relates to the world of business. President Erdoğan will benefit from close connections with Saudi Arabia as he works to revive the Turkish economy and combat high inflation. In March, many agreements were struck between the two nations with this goal in mind. The second possible area of collaboration is in the field of defence. Saudi Arabia has indicated interest in getting more involved with the Turkish defence sector. High-ranking representatives of the Saudi defence ministry as well as domestic defence contractors visited Turkey in January. In the coming five years, Turkey and Saudi Arabia’s defence trade partnership will probably continue to grow. The third opportunity for productive collaboration is in the regional and global context.

The continuing Sudanese problem must be resolved, and Ankara and Riyadh may work together to find a compromise between the opposing factions. Further collaboration on regional topics of shared interest may also be possible. It is also crucial to take into account the global context, notably the connection between the two nations and the United States, since the results of the American presidential elections in 2024 will have a big impact on Saudi-Turkish ties.

Between now and 2028, the GCC countries may expect their dealings with Ankara to go on as usual. Ankara will keep placing a high importance on its relations with the affluent GCC nations, which are crucial to Turkey’s trade and defense sectors.

A few days after Erdoğan was re-elected, Turkey and the UAE approved a cooperation pact to boost their two countries’ bilateral commerce to $40 billion over the next five years. The UAE’s secretary of state for international trade, Thani Ahmed al-Zeyoudi, stated on Twitter: “This deal marks a new era of cooperation in our long-standing friendship.”

As Ankara’s reconciliation with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi continues to gather momentum. Turkey’s strong alliance with Qatar is also expected to continue to grow.

As much will rely on how Erdoğan defines what is supposed to be his final term and, consequently, his legacy; and much will also depend on how the rest of the world, especially the West, reacts to his win. Turkey is seen as being solidly in the authoritarian camp in the worldwide conflict between the two ideologies, along with other regressive nations such as Hungary, India, and Brazil.

Many Gulf officials were relieved to see Erdoğan re-elected since his opponent Kemal Kilicdaroglu was likely to have modified Turkey’s foreign policy in ways that may have hurt their interests. If Kilicdaroglu triumphed, Qatar in particular had cause to be concerned about the degradation of its ties with Ankara.

Sweden’s NATO Application

Growing international pressure on Turkey to approve Sweden’s application for membership in NATO before the military alliance’s meeting in July has been rejected by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Following his hard-fought re-election last month, Western diplomats had hoped Erdogan would soften his stance on the sensitive diplomatic issue. Significant global repercussions will follow—not least for NATO. Turkey has made an extra effort to develop tight ties with Russia in contrast to the alliance’s other members.

Turkey’s membership in NATO is cherished by Erdoğan because he believes it provides him with more clout in world affairs. Erdoğan has pushed for the convening of peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, just as Turkey assisted in mediating a significant grain export agreement between the warring nations last year. Erdoğan has attempted to depict Turkey as a vital diplomatic mediator between Russia and the West.

In a recent interview with CNN, Erdoğan bragged about his “special relationship” with Russian President Vladimir Putin and reiterated Turkey’s position as the only NATO member to oppose Sweden’s membership. Additionally, everything points to a strengthened friendship between Erdoğan and Putin during the next five years.

Erdoğan has exploited the NATO membership of Sweden and Finland as a trump card to pressure the West. And he has done so in a variety of ways, so he will attempt to use it even more.

Rethinking Turkey’s relationships.

In contrast to how it was during the time of the Arab Spring, ten years ago, Erdoğan is now beginning a new chapter. He restored ties with Saudi Arabia and the UAE during his last tenure, and he will keep moving in that direction. Reestablishing ties with Turkey is an alternate strategy for balancing Iranian influence in the area from a GCC political standpoint.

There is every reason to anticipate that these rapprochements will pick up steam over Erdoğan’s remaining five years in office. Sales of Turkish drones to these two GCC nations would especially help to fortify ties that have just started to repair.