This article by Sarah Döbbener explores the background of Ahmed al-Sharaa, formerly known as Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, the newly appointed interim President of Syria. As a key figure in Syria’s insurgency and the former leader of Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Sharaa’s past offers critical insights into how he might govern and what his leadership could mean for Syria’s diverse population. Understanding his trajectory—from jihadist commander to political leader—may shed light on the future of the country in this pivotal moment.

On January 29, Ahmed al-Sharaa was appointed Syria’s interim president, just 52 days after Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) seized Damascus under his leadership. But who exactly is he? His past raises plenty of questions, and understanding his background might give us a clue as to how he might govern the war-torn country and whether Syria has any real chance of a peaceful and inclusive transition to democracy.

Ahmed al-Sharaa’s early years

Originally from the Golan Heights, al-Sharaa’s family was forced to flee due to Israeli occupation, finding refuge in Saudi Arabia, where he was born in 1982. In 1989, his family returned to Damascus, where al-Sharaa lived with his parents and his six siblings in the upper-middle class, religiously mixed neighbourhood of Mezzeh.

His father – an engineer – was an opponent to the Assad dynasty. While still in secondary school, he protested against the Ba’ath party’s seizure of power. However, to remain in Syria his father became more moderate and was employed as a government official.

Although his family was not particularly religious, al-Sharaa often prayed in the mosque and was described as the most devout of his friends back then. Nevertheless, people who knew al-Sharaa then emphasize that his relationship to religion at that time was far from extreme.

The 9/11 al-Qaeda attacks in 2001 and America’s war on terror were defining moments for al-Sharaa. In the aftermath, he embraced traditional Islamic attire and let his beard grow long, signalling a shift in his personal and ideological journey.

Al-Qaeda and Iraq

In 2003, at the age of 20, al-Sharaa travelled to Iraq to join the Iraq resistance against U.S. occupation.

According to intelligence documents, al-Sharaa soon returned home, however wasn’t welcome anymore because of his father not accepting his opposing views and ideologies. He returned to Iraq in 2005 and joined a Salafi jihadi organisation which later merged with al-Qaeda. Following jihadist convention, Ahmed al-Sharaa adopted the nom de guerre Abu Mohammed al-Jolani masking his identity under a veil of anonymity.

At that time, AQI (al-Qaeda in Iraq) was led by the radical Jordanian militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who was known for his brutality, including the beheading of kidnapped foreigners. Hence, although al-Jolani claims in a recent interview that he has never harmed any civilians in Iraq, it seems unlikely. In 2006, al-Sharaa (now known as al-Jolani) was arrested by U.S. forces and spent five years in different detention centres, among them the notorious prisons Abu Ghraib and Camp Bucca.

Return to Syria and the formation of Jabhat al-Nusra

In August 2011, amid the growing protests against President Bashar al-Assad, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who would later become one of the most infamous leaders of ISIS, authorized Abu Mohammed al-Jolani to establish an al-Qaeda branch in Syria. Al-Jolani, recently released from prison, entered Syria with six men to lay the foundation for what would become Jabhat al-Nusra.

By 2012, Jabhat al-Nusra had emerged as al-Qaeda’s official affiliate in Syria, calling for jihad against the Assad government. The group rapidly expanded, attracting a significant number of fighters and carrying out a series of insurgent attacks. Some of these operations, including a February 2012 suicide bombing in Aleppo that killed 28 people, among them four civilians, brought swift international condemnation.

By 2013, al-Nusra had drawn international attention, leading to its designation as a terrorist organization by the UN, U.S., UK, and other countries while the U.S. also placed a $10 million bounty on al-Jolani’s head.

Meanwhile, al-Qaeda in Iraq had evolved into the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) and later ISIS. In April 2013, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi sought to absorb Jabhat al-Nusra into his expanding organization. However, tensions between al-Jolani and al-Baghdadi ran deep. Al-Jolani apparently rejected ISIS’s brutal tactics and ideological stance, refusing the proposed merger. Instead, he reaffirmed his loyalty to al-Qaeda, further entrenching Jabhat al-Nusra’s position as a distinct entity.

His ideological alignment was demonstrated during a 2014 interview, where he argued that Syria should be governed under Sharia law and that ethnic and religious minorities like Christians and Druze would not be accommodated.

Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)

Despite his demonstrated loyalty to al-Qaeda, he severed ties in 2016, renaming his group ‘Jabhat Fateh al-Sham’. This break probably reflects the national focus that al-Jolani has adopted over time to broaden the groups’ appeal to local Syrians. Moreover, this decision may also have been made to deter targeting by international forces, demonstrating a pragmatic approach.

By 2017, al-Jolani took things a step further, uniting various armed opposition groups under a new umbrella organization: Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS).

Since then, HTS sought to secure its dominance over the Idlib region by establishing governance structures while imposing authoritarian rule. At the same time, it eliminated ISIS and al-Qaeda affiliates while enforcing strict social policies, further consolidating its power. During its rule in Idlib, HTS has been accused of various human rights violations, including the suppression of dissent, with reports of arrests, torture and crackdowns on journalists. Women have faced discrimination, exclusion from political bodies and gender segregation in schools.

In 2023, al-Jolani intensified efforts to distance HTS from its al-Qaeda roots, promoting a message of pluralism and religious tolerance. As part of this shift in image, HTS dissolved the notorious religious police.

Despite these changes, the HTS remains listed as a terrorist organisation by the U.S., UK, EU and other countries.

From Violence to a New Constitution?

Nevertheless, the latest developments in Syria  paint a bleak picture. During the massacre in the Latakia region some estimates claim that 1557 Alawite civilians were killed (the NCF Secretary General claims at least twice that number have actually been killed) in what appeared to be an act of revenge following clashes between Syrian security forces and fighters loyal to Bashar al-Assad. Although interim president Ahmed al-Sharaa urged restraint and no reprisals against the Alawite community, he failed to maintain control over his security forces. This incident underscores the deep divisions within Syria’s security forces and highlights al-Sharaa’s struggle to assert authority over them.

In response to the killings, al-Sharaa announced the formation of a fact-finding committee to investigate the extrajudicial executions. However, scepticism remains high, many questioning whether this initiative is a genuine effort to seek justice or merely a move to appease Western governments.

Meanwhile, al-Sharaa achieved a significant political breakthrough by securing a landmark agreement with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces. On March 10, he brokered a ceasefire and apparently facilitated the integration of Kurdish armed forces into the government’s security apparatus.

Later in the week, al-Sharaa signed a new constitutional declaration, drafted by a committee he appointed. While the document includes provisions for freedom of expression, press rights, and the political and social rights of women, it also raises concerns. Notably, it retains the requirement that the head of state must be Muslim. Additionally, while the constitution nominally upholds the separation of powers, certain clauses grant al-Sharaa significant influence over all branches of government, raising fears about the extent of his authority.

New moderate ruler or militant?

After the HTS took over Damascus on 8 December 2024 under the leadership of al-Jolani, the latter dropped his nom de guerre and revealed his real name, Ahmed al-Sharaa. This move was seen by some as part of his plan to rebrand himself in order to gain legitimacy among the Syrian people and the international community by figuratively leaving his past behind.

This rebranding began back in 2016, after he cut ties with al-Qaeda and appeared in public for the first time in shirt and trousers instead of the typical robe and turban. The process of creating a more moderate jihadist group was also evident during HTS’s rule over Idlib.

Furthermore, HTS demonstrated its claimed moderate ideology when it seized Aleppo, the first city to fall during the rebel offensive in November 2024. HTS gave individual assurances to Christian residents that they would not be harmed. In addition, al-Sharaa is reported to have made diplomatic efforts to bring towns controlled by other rebel groups under his rule without losses. These efforts to find peaceful solutions for all Syrians therefore seemed promising for the future of the country. Rather than following a rigid ideology, al-Sharaa emphasised pragmatism and seemingly reflects a more moderate strategy, journalists say.

However, others believe that this new moderate ideology is just a disguise to hide their radical ambitions, both locally and globally. During the period of HTS control in Idlib, many human rights violations were recorded, including torture, enforced disappearances and detentions. HTS also monopolised power in Idlib, acting as a one-state party and suppressing civil society activism and political opposition.

The monopolisation of power is also reflected in the transitional government set up by the HTS after its capture of Damascus. Not only is the cabinet largely controlled by HTS members, but al-Shaara’s relatives hold key positions in the new transitional regime, such as his brother Maher, who has been appointed Minister of Health. The new constitutional declaration also shows how much power al-Sharaa will retain during the transitional regime. Given the concentration of executive power and the ability to influence the legislature, democratic rule seems a long way off.

Recent events suggest that al-Sharaa may struggle to govern the war-torn country, as evidenced by the recent massacre of Alawite civilians. Not only do his security forces appear to be slipping from his control, but his vision of an inclusive Syria is increasingly uncertain.

Shift in tradition, or merely a strategic façade?

By adopting a rebranding strategy and moderating its ideology, we might expect the government to adopt a blend of traditional Islamic governance and modern statecraft, with the aim of unifying and stabilising the nation.

However, if this rebranding is part of al-Sharaa’s strategy to convince the Syrians and the international community of a shift in approach to gain territorial and political gains, it could indicate a return to the same practices seen during his rule in Idlib.

The question now is how much the past can predict a person’s future. Can people and their ideologies really change? Without answers to these questions, there are still doubts about the style of government al-Sharaa will adopt. It remains to be seen how much is pretence and how much is reality.

Image at the top: Wikimedia