After nearly a decade of war in Yemen, the situation remains unstable, and Yemen remains one of the world’s largest humanitarian crises. With the unofficial extension of the 2022 UN-mediated truce, there has been a relative pause to hostilities. However, the evolving conflict in the Middle East has resulted in uncertainty and unpredictability in Yemen, particularly in regard to Ansar Allah’s response to the war on Gaza.
A Multifaceted Crisis
The crisis in Yemen can be described as a stalled struggle for power, involving three main definable forms of authority: the Internationally Recognised Government (IRG), Ansar Allah (commonly referred to as the Houthis in Western media), and the Southern Transition Council (STC).
The IRG was historically based in Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, before it was forced to flee to Aden, in late 2014, at the beginning of the conflict. It is currently led by an eight-member Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), based in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The IRG now does not control much territory in Yemen, but has the formal allegiance of the remnants of the Yemeni Republic armed forces and security services.
Ansar Allah, commonly referred to as the Houthis in Western media, is an Iranian allied militia group. It is based in Sanaa, North Yemen, and runs all but two provinces in the north.
The STC is a secessionist political organisation recognised by the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Established in 2017, the STC joined the IRG’s leadership body, the PLC, in 2022, where it vowed to represent the will of the southerners of Yemen. Despite the significant fragmentation in southern Yemen, the STC maintains strong authority in Aden and other south western provinces, though its influence is more limited in south eastern regions.
There are additional actors in the crisis, including international actors, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Resistance Forces and the Islamic State in Yemen, further adding to the complexity of the crisis. Shifting dynamics between international actors, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, also created instability in the Yemen crisis. Since 2014, the UAE supported Saudi Arabia’s efforts in the Yemen crisis, such as by opposing Iran’s nuclear deal with the West and having its own troops in Yemen. The UAE also saw this as an opportunity to protect its own economic interests, due to its maritime trade routes close to Yemen. However, in 2019, the UAE withdrew its troops from Yemen: a move that led to drastic changes in Yemeni governance, with the STC being recognised by the IRG in 2020. This created further instability in Yemen and serves as a reminder of the multifaceted nature of the crisis.
The War On Yemen, its Economy and its People
The war in Yemen has long been described as the stage of a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran, with Saudi Arabia backing the IRG and Iran supporting Ansar Allah. However, Ansar Allah play a significant role in the conflict, independent of Iran’s aims in Yemen. They are often described as unpredictable, but they have a tight leadership and strong motivations to remodel Yemeni society, including the control of Yemen’s education system, the restriction of women and mass indoctrination.
Despite Ansar Allah’s tight leadership, organisation and control in Yemen, its economy remains a critical weakness. Whilst some income is generated from taxes, fuel smuggling and confiscation of properties, these sources are insufficient to sustain its war efforts, pay officials and provide governance. Yemen’s financial system is made up of two central banks; the IRG-controlled bank in Aden, and the Houthi-controlled bank in Sana’a. In an attempt to create an alternative economy to the IRG, Ansar Allah minted a new 100-riyal coin as a substitute for damaged banknotes in March 2024. Analysts believe that the matter has no impact on the economic conditions in the “areas of legitimacy” because it is only a process of replacement, and that the concerns being talked about are political and not economic. However, the move by Ansar Allah is also being described as the beginning of a “financial war” between Ansar Allah and the IRG, which could increase inflation rates, and increase the risk of Yemen’s economic collapse. By July 2024, the IRG was working to isolate the central bank in Sana’a, but was forced to stop due to pressures from Saudi Arabia. This isolation would have cut off the Houthi-controlled bank from international payments, damaging its economy, and affecting Yemeni families that rely so heavily on remittances.
On the ground, Yemen’s most vulnerable citizens continue to suffer. There is growing malnutrition due to food shortages, and soaring prices of food across Yemen. Additionally, the World Food Programme began to reduce its support in Ansar Allah controlled areas in September 2023, due to its own funding shortages. This resulted in 4 million Yemenis not receiving the food assistance they require. Across Yemen, there are 17.6 million people facing food insecurity, and 18.2 million requiring humanitarian assistance, 14 million of which include women and children. Urgent international support and action is required, yet the crisis remains overlooked by mainstream media and Western governments.
Saudi Iranian Rapprochement
In 2023, Saudi Arabia and Iran reestablished diplomatic ties after a seven-year rupture, in a deal brokered by China. The rapprochement has restored diplomacy and created a less antagonistic relationship between the two nations, but tensions remain. It’s clear that from a Saudi Arabian perspective, a diplomatic relationship with Iran is preferred to an antagonistic one. With great mistrust and ongoing regional conflicts, the rapprochement is yet to lead to any significant progress in terms of the Yemen crisis.
As relations strengthen between the long-time regional rivals, the General Chief of staff of the Saudi armed forces, Fayyad al-Ruwaili, visited Tehran on Sunday (10th November) for talks with Iranian officials in a rare high-level meeting since the countries restored ties last year. The meeting was held at the Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Headquarters, where “the development of defence diplomacy and the expansion of bilateral cooperation” were among the main topics of the meeting, said Iran’s official news agency IRNA. The Iranian General, Mohammad Bagheri, called for “increased security cooperation” between the two countries at the meeting, and stated that Iran would like the Saudi Navy to join further naval exercises in the coming year, either as participants or as observers. The visit demonstrates the growing relations between the two countries, raising hope that it will be reflected in peace talks with Ansar Allah.
This visit came two weeks after Saudi Arabia and Iran have conducted joint naval exercises in the Sea of Oman. A Saudi Ministry of Defence Brigadier General, Turki Al-Malki, confirmed the exercises in a statement on October 25th 2024. The joint military exercises in the Red Sea can be described as symbolic; proposed by Saudi Arabia, it is unusual, yet gives substance to the rapprochement.
The Role of the U.S.
The rapprochement aligns with Saudi Arabia’s broader security goals, signalling a shift towards independence from U.S. support. Whilst the U.S. remains a very active player in the defence and security of the Gulf Arab states, as well as supporting Egypt and Jordan, the rapprochement comes as a blow to the U.S., as it has long worked to isolate Iran, as Israel’s close ally. The U.S. may be losing some of its influence in the region, perhaps following the recent scale back of its strategy in the Middle East and the increasingly superficial defence commitments.
However, with the election of Donald Trump as the next U.S. President, the role of the U.S. in the Middle East could see a dramatic change from January 2025. In the Gulf Arab states, Trump is seen as a stabilising force, due to his focus on “strengthening alliances and curbing extremist forces”, says UAE Business leader, Khalaf al-Habtoor. However, during his previous Presidency, Trump raised doubts about the U.S.’ overall commitment in the Gulf, and about his even-handedness among Gulf states.
On the other hand, the sentiment in Iran is different. During his last presidency, Trump pulled the U.S. out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the Iranian nuclear deal that aims to halt Iran’s nuclear programme, due to its failure in addressing Iran’s missile programme and its continued funding of regional proxies. Trump also ordered the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, the leader of the Revolutionary Guards’ Quds Force, much to Iran’s outrage. Now, it seems that Trump is likely to go ahead with a “maximum pressure” policy, in order to bankrupt Iran. The evolving dynamics between the U.S., Saudi Arabia, and Iran may lead to a shift in the geopolitical landscape, influence the course of the Yemen crisis and shape the prospects for future peace negotiations.
Saudi-Mediated Negotiations
Before the Saudi-Iran rapprochement, Saudi Arabia engaged in negotiations with Ansar Allah, with the UN in the background. The signing of the rapprochement encouraged progress in the negotiations. The negotiations led to an outline of a deal being reached, where Saudi Arabia offered to pay all Ansar Allah state salaries for a year and make significant contributions to its development and governance. In exchange for this, Ansar Allah agreed to prisoner exchanges, the opening of roads, and allowing the Internationally Recognised Government to export oil. These measures would have built confidence and trust between Saudi Arabia and Ansar Allah, which is critical in looking towards peace in Yemen. However, this deal has been on pause since the events of October 7th. Ansar Allah have a “principled, humanitarian, moral, religious and faith-based stance” in support of the Palestinian people.
Red Sea Attacks
Since October 7th, in addition to Ansar Allah’s declaration of support for the Palestinian people, there have been consistent attacks on commercial and military vessels in the Red Sea. The vessels under attack are those with ties to Israel and their allies, including the U.S. and the UK. The attacks, with the use of drones and missiles, have caused major disruptions to international shipping routes, resulting in vessel diversions and a cost to global trade. In response, a naval task force has been established to protect shipping in the area, and the U.S., the UK, and Israel have conducted multiple strikes against Ansar Allah targets in Yemen. Despite this, Ansar Allah attacks continue, with continued expression of its support to Palestinians, and with escalation against its enemy, Israel. The attacks deepen Ansar Allah’s role in the ongoing regional conflict, and with direct attacks on Western actors, and their subsequent involvement, there could be further complications for peace efforts in Yemen.
The Prospect of Peace in Yemen
Looking ahead to the future of the Yemen crisis, the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement could play a crucial role in shaping the prospects for peace. Currently, the effects are not being felt in Yemen, partly due Ansar Allah’s critical role in the crisis. Its continued influence on the ground in Yemen, as well as its role in shifting regional dynamics, the war on Gaza and its attacks in the Red Sea, shows its commitment to the “Axis of Resistance”. Due to the ongoing war in Gaza, and Iran’s involvement, Israel remains a threat to Iran. In light of this, it seems likely that Iran will maintain a close relationship with Ansar Allah. What does this all mean for Yemen? With its peace negotiations on pause since October 7th, 2023, it seems that for there be peace in Yemen, there must first be peace in the Red Sea.
Featured image above is of Basateen, a poor area of Aden – photo:© European Union/ECHO/H.Veit is from https://www.flickr.com/
